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CONTRACTING FOR TORTS
J. ShaharDillbary*

INTRODUCTION

In many instances, actors will not participate in a tortious
activity unless others agree (or otherwise pre-commit) to join the
activity or sponsor its operation. Contract law refuses to respect
such agreements. It treats "a promise to commit a tort or to induce
the commission of a tort" as "unenforceable."' This Article reveals
that, in some cases, tort law gives what contract law takes away: it
encourages the formation of and effectively enforces contracts to
commit torts. Tort law allows a party who acted on the agreement
and harmed another to recover from the non-injuring party who
breached her promise and behaved carefully or refused to pay her
share. In other words, tort law requires careful actors to pay
expectation damages to the injurer. The result is ironic 2: tort law
* Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law. I would like to
thank Bobby Ahdieh, Ronen Avraham, Oren Bar-Gill, Lisa Bernstein, Bill
Brewbaker, the Honorable Judge Joseph Colquitt, Richard Epstein, Mirit EyalCohen, Phillip Curry, Alan Durham, Luigi Franzoni, Saul Levmore, Susan
Lyons, Mike Pardo, Ariel Porat, Caryn Roseman, Hans-Bernd Schafer, Alex
Stein, Adam Steinman, Avishalom Tor, Fred Vars, and the participants of the
European and Midwestern Law and Economics conferences, the Southern
Economic Association Conference, and the Haifa Law & Economics Workshop
for their comments; and Traci Cunningham, Hannah Hicks, Kenton
McGalliard, and Joey Schwartz for their excellent research assistance. 0 J.
Shahar Dillbary.
1. Fisher v. Halliburton, 696 F. Supp. 2d 710, 716 (S.D. Tex. 2010), order
vacated, appeal dismissed by 667 F.3d 602 (5th Cir. 2012) ("It is axiomatic that
one may not contract to commit a tort."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 192 (AM. LAw INST. 1981); id. § 192 cmt. b. (explaining that a promise to share
the cost of a tortious act that "may tend to induce the commission of the
act . . . is unenforceable for the same reason as is a promise to commit a tort"it is against public policy); id. § 178 ("[W]hen an agreement involves a serious
crime or tort, that unenforceability is plain."); id. § 8 (explaining that "[a]n
unenforceable contract is one for the breach of which neither the remedy of
damages nor the remedy of specific performance is available . . .").
2. As used in this Article, the term "irony" is not intended to pass
judgment or express disapproval. Rather, it is used to highlight a "striking
reversal of what is expected"-that is, to note an "incongruity between the
actual result of a sequence of events and the normal or expected result."
Definition of Irony, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com
/dictionary/irony (last visited Nov. 4, 2017) (distinguishing between Socratic,
dramatic, and situational uses of the term).
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enforces agreements to engage in tortious activities-agreements
that contract law would not enforce due to their tortious nature. In
doing so, tort law protects the interests of the injurer who kept her
promise, which contrasts with what many believe to be its
conventional role: protecting the victim.
To see this, consider the following example (based on
illustrations from the Restatements (First) and (Second) of
Contracts):
Example 1: Defamation. D1 and D2 have a feud with
their neighbor, P. D1 asks D2, who owns a newspaper, to
publish a statement about P known to both to be false and
defamatory. D1 also promises D2 to share Ps damagesestimated at $100.
For separate reasons, each values
harming P at $60 (measured by each party's willingness
and ability to pay). 3
First, note that D1's promise to share Ps damages is necessary
to induce D2 to commit a tort. Indeed, without such a promise D2
can expect only a loss (60<100).4 An enforceable agreement to share
P's damages would make the tortious behavior worthwhile for both
D1 and D2. For example, an agreement to share Ps damages in
equal shares would promise each $10 (60-100/2). But even if the
parties reach such an agreement, courts would likely find it against
public policy and unenforceable. 5 This means that if, after the
defamatory statement is published, D1 refuses to share Ps
damages, courts will not require her to do so. Knowing this, D2 will
not publish the defamatory statement to begin with.
Tort law is not indifferent to contract law's fastidious taste
(actually distaste) for tortious activities. It offers mechanisms that
allow courts to save face (they can still condemn the tortious activity
and agreements to behave carelessly) and, at the same time, permit
the impermissible.
Tort law does so by offering a default
arrangement akin to a standardized agreement that the parties can
adopt-a "tort-tract.' If the parties enter into a tort-tract, tort law
3.

The example is based on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
INST. 1981); id. § 178 cmt. d, illus. 7 (explaining
that a promise to share a judgment in order to induce another to commit a tort
is unenforceable); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 571 cmt. a, illus. 1 (AM.

§ 192 cmt. b, illus. 5 (AM. LAW

1932). Throughout this Article damages and benefits are expressed
in expected values. See also infra Subpart III.A.
LAW INST.

4. Ignoring, for a moment, the impact of tort law and theories like
concerted action, which would hold both D1 and D2 liable.
5. See supra notes 1, 4.
6. "Tort-tracts" should not be confused with con-torts. The term "con-tort"
was first used by Grant Gilmore to refer to (i) illusory contracts that (ii) lack
any manifested assent or exchange of consideration, (iii) that courts infer or
impose based on tort concepts such as reliance (iv) after some event occurred (v)
to avoid injustice.

GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 73-98 (Ronald K.

L. Collins ed., 2d ed. 1995); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90
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will enforce its terms against a reneging party. In other words, a
tort-tract is an actual contract or commitment to engage in
wrongdoing 7 enforced by tort law.
This is illustrated in Example 1. On its face, entering into an
agreement to commit a wrong seems futile. What is the point in D1
making a promise that is not enforceable and on which D2 cannot
rely? The reason is that tort law enforces this promise. By entering
into an agreement to commit a tort, D1 and D2 entered into a torttract. The agreement itself triggers a set of default tort rules that,
in effect, fill some of the gaps created by contract law. Here, the
agreement triggers tort law's concerted action doctrine.
The
doctrine holds liable not only the injurer (e.g., the publisher) but
also those who encourage the injurer (e.g., Dl, who promised to
share Ps damages). 8 The result is a tort-tract to share the cost of
the tortious activity. In Example 1, the terms of the tort-tract are
simple. If D1 and D2 agree to commit or facilitate a tort, both will
share the cost of the victim's injury as joint-tortfeasors. The sharing
(or apportionment) is made according to another predetermined
known rule (e.g., joint and several liability with contribution). 9 The
result is that the parties reach an actual agreement that tort law
(but not contract law) respects and enforces.
With tort law on her side, D2 does not need to trust D1 or rely
on contract law. If D1 reneges and refuses to share the cost of the

(AM. LAW INST. 1981) (stating that a promise given by one party without
consideration is nevertheless binding if the promisor should have reasonably
expected that her promise would induce a certain action, the promisee was
indeed induced and took that action, and "injustice can be avoided only by
enforcement of the promise"); id. § 17 ("[T]he formation of a contract requires a
bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange and
consideration."). Tort-tracts are different in every aspect. They are (i) real
understandings or commitments, (ii) adopted by the parties (iii) in exchange for
consideration (iv) before and (v) in furtherance of (vi) a tortious activity. In
other words, tort-tracts respect and protect the parties' actual agreement and,
ironically, more so than contract law.

7. As with the term "irony," this Article uses the terms "wrongdoing," a
"wrong" and "wrongdoers" interchangeably with the terms tortious, tort and
tortfeasors to refers to behaviors (or those who engage in behaviors) that give
rise to liability, as opposed to denoting an evil or immoral act. Thus, in
Example 1, D1 and D2 are "wrongdoers" who engage in "wrongdoing" because
they knowingly publish a false statement-a behavior for which the law assigns
liability.
8.

W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 46, at 323 (5th ed. 1984). The same holds even if none of the parties is a
For example, if both parties simply signed the defamatory
publisher.
statement. See also infra notes 71-74 (discussing such scenarios).
9. J. Shahar Dillbary, Apportioning Liability Behind a Veil of Ignorance,
62 HASTINGS L.J. 1729, 1758 (2011) (analyzing the effects of different
apportionment regimes).
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injury, tort law will force her to do so.10 It will require Dl, who did
not harm the victim, to share the cost of the tortious act she
promised to sponsor. And knowing this, D2 can expect that her
liability will be sufficiently diluted (from $100 to $50) to make the
activity worthwhile (60>100/2).11
In Example 1, once D2 publishes the false statement, D1 could
not act strategically to avoid her obligation to share the cost of Ps
harm. The reason is that upon performance (publication), D1 and
D2 instantaneously became joint-tortfeasors who are required to
share the cost of the harm. Sometimes, however, the nature of the

activity is such that a party may have an opportunity to renege even
after the tortious activity started. This can happen, for example, in
an agreement to drag race, where each party must continuously
engage in the tortious activity. Example 2 below illustrates this
point.

It is based on the Restatement (Second) of Torts and is a

variant of Example

1.12

Example 2: Drag Race. Two strangers, D1 and D2, stop
at a red light. They consider whether to engage in a drag
race. Each values racing at $60. If one or both parties
drive carelessly, the expected harm is $100.13
As with Example 1, neither would race (60<100) unless the
parties agree to share the cost of the harm (60>100/2). And as
before, contract law would not enforce the agreement. Yet, tort law
10. D1 may still be able to escape her obligation if, for example, she is
insolvent, but this is a risk that D2 assumed when she decided to enter into an
agreement with Dl.
11. Ex-ante, each actor should assume that liability would be shared
equally between all tortfeasors regardless of how, after the injury materialized,
the jury apportions damages between the parties. Dillbary, supra note 9; see
infra Part III.F.
12. Intentional torts may give rise to punitive damages, which may serve
as an effective anti-dilution mechanism, but only if they are set at a high
enough level. J. Shahar Dillbary, Tortfest, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 953, 978 (2013);
see infra Part III.B. Moreover, for the reasons explained in Part II and Part
III.B, infra, those interested in curtailing tort-tracts may want to adjust
punitive damages upwards with the number of tortfeasors.
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. a, illus. 2 (AM. LAW INST.
1979) (explaining that even if only one of the drivers hits the victim, both will
be held liable). Note that the same dynamic that occurs in Example 1 (i.e.,
asynchronous actions resulting in reduced opportunity to renege) may also
occur in drag races. For example, when prior to the race a party marks the
finish line or announces the start of the race that party will be liable in case of
an injury. In both cases, the acts of the participants are asynchronous. The
enticing actions of non-publishing neighbor in Example 1 and the one who
signal the beginning (or ending) of the race are followed by someone else's
performance (i.e., the publisher and drivers). See, e.g., Sparks v. Ala. Power
Co., 679 So. 2d 678, 679 (Ala. 1996) (holding liable a party who prior to the race
"drove his truck down the road to mark the finish line"); Hood v. Evans, 126
S.E.2d 898, 899-900 (Ga. Ct. App. 1962) (holding liable a non-driver who had
signaled the start of the race).
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would. The agreement to engage in a wrong would trigger a number
of tort rules, including the doctrine of concerted action. 14 The
doctrine allows courts to hold both drivers liable so long as they
were pursuing a common enterprise' 5-here, literally pursuing (i.e.,
racing) each other. Thus, if the parties can see each other racing,
they can be sure that in the case of an accident, both would be held
liable and share the cost of an injury.
But what if the drivers cannot see each other? Each driver
would be concerned that the other driver had abandoned the race.
In such a case, with no partner to a common plan, a driver who
keeps racing knows that if she injures another, she alone will be
liable for the entire harm, and can therefore only expect a loss
(60<100). The result is a "Drivers' Dilemma." Each driver prefers
racing if the other driver does the same, but prefers abandoning the
race otherwise.' 6 This Article shows that tort law solves the Driver's
Dilemma in favor of participating in the race. Tort law does so by
assuring each party that the non-injuring driver who, in breach of
her promise, abandoned the race or drove carefully, will
nevertheless be held liable.1 7 The result is that, ex-ante, each driver
can expect a benefit (60>100/2), and a careless race will take place
even if the parties cannot observe each other. Here, tort law
incentivizes the parties to engage in a tortious activity. Once again,
the parties do not need to trust each other or rely on contract law.
Tort law protects the parties' (tort-tractual) expectations.
The rest of the Article proceeds as follows. Part I uses concerted
action theory as a case study to present the basic theory. It shows
that although contract law does not enforce agreements to engage in
tortious activities, tort law provides an alternative.
Instead of
contracting, the parties can tort-tract. They can adopt the default
arrangement that tort law offers. Tort-tracting-that is, adopting
tort law's arrangement-can be done easily and at a very low cost.
Moreover, tort law provides an effective enforcement mechanism. It
promises a gain to the injurer (e.g., the publisher of the false
statement) who acted on the agreement. In contrast, those who
promised to partake in the activity or share its cost and reneged are

14.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 876 cmt. a ("Parties are acting in

concert when they act in accordance with an agreement to cooperate in a
particular line of conduct or to accomplish a particular result."); see infra notes
20-24 and accompanying text.
15. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAw OF TORTS

§ 340, at 936 (2000) ("A contemporary
example of concerted action is the case of drivers who agree, tacitly or
otherwise, to an illegal race on the public streets."); KEETON ET AL., supra note 8.

16. See infra notes 27-32 and accompanying text (describing the Drivers'
Dilemma in detail).
17. Lemons v. Kelly, 397 P.3d 784, 787 (Or. 1964) (holding that one who
participates in a race cannot withdraw unless he notifies the other party at a
time when that party can still avoid injuring another); see also infra notes 3035 and accompanying text.
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required to pay expectation damages 18 By offering and enforcing
such arrangements, tort law encourages parties to engage in group
wrongdoing.
Part II focuses on cases where parties cannot negotiate. It
shows that in these cases, the parties can pre-commit in a different
way. Each party can unilaterally signal her interest in the tortious
activity. Tort law makes such signals and commitments credible. It
does so by requiring those who misrepresented their willingness to
engage in the tortious activity or share its cost to pay expectation
damages to the injurer who relied on the representation. Moreover,
Part II reveals that tort law allows parties to "test the ground" by
way of sampling to see if other actors would join the tortious
activities. If an insufficient number of actors join, tort law exempts
from liability the party who engaged in sampling, but then decided
to cease the activity. In deviation from prior literature and the
Restatements, this Article explains when and under what conditions
those who contributed to the victim's harm should be exempted from
liability, and those whose contribution may seem "insubstantial"
should nevertheless be held liable.
Part III discusses possible
concerns and objections, the impact of insolvency, punitive damages
and the criminal system as well as the model's assumptions. The
Article ends with concluding remarks.
I. AGREEMENTS (AS CREDIBLE COMMITMENTS) TO ACT TORTIOUSLY
A.

Cost-SharingAgreements and Their Enforcement

One tort doctrine that is explicitly designed to effectuate and
execute tort-tracts is concerted action. The concerted action doctrine
allows courts to impose liability not only on the party who physically
injured the victim but also on non-injuring parties who either
agreed or pre-committed to engage in the tortious activity. 19 Courts
and scholars often speak of actors pursuing a common "plan,"
"purpose," "design," or "enterprise." 20 The most accepted and oftcited description is that of Prosser and Keeton. According to the
acclaimed authors, liability is imposed on "[a]ll those who, in
pursuance of a common plan or design to commit a tortious act,
actively take part in it, or further it by cooperation or request,

18. Expectation damages are usually different than compensatory damages
in that they also include loss of profits. This Article focuses on a set of cases
where the two types of damages coincide. This overlap occurs because, in the
cases discussed, each party benefits directly from the activity; however, the
breaching party refuses to share the cost of the harm.
In such cases,
expectation damages (requiring the party to share the cost of the injury as she

promised) are identical to compensatory damages (sharing the damage to the
victim).
19. KEETON ET AL., supra note 8, § 46, at 322; see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. a.
20. KEETON ET AL., supra note 8, § 46, at 322-23.
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or ... lend aid or encouragement to the wrongdoers, or ratify and
adopt the wrongdoer's acts done for their benefit." 21
The stated goal of the doctrine is to "express[] moral
condemnation for the actions of all of the defendants" 22 and "to deter
anti-social behavior." 23 The irony is that, in some cases, concerted
action does the opposite. As Examples 1 and 2 demonstrate,
concerted action may be the very reason the victim is injured.
Indeed, in these examples, but-for the doctrine, the tortious activity
would not take place, and the victim would not be harmed. This and
other tort doctrines encourage the parties to behave tortiously.
Together, they serve as gap-fillers or default arrangements in the
tort-tract adopted by the parties. Some of the aspects and functions
of these boilerplate features are discussed below.
1.

Cost-Sharing Commitments

A group causation theory like concerted action comes with a
default cost-sharing arrangement. By simply committing to engage
in a tort, the parties, in effect, promise to share the cost of the harm.
To see why, reconsider the drivers in Example 2. There, two
strangers meet at a red light. Each is interested in racing, but
neither will take the time to negotiate a thorough agreement or a
cost-sharing provision; nor do they need to. Tort law provides them
with an alternative. Instead of contracting over the specifics of a
tort, they can tort-tract. Under tort law's default arrangement, all
the parties need to do is to simply enter into an agreement to race.
Because their agreement will trigger concerted action theory, both
will be held liable for-that is, both will share-the entire harm,
regardless of whether one or both of them injure the victim.

24

The

cost-sharing feature encourages the parties to engage in the tortious
behavior. In some cases, but-for the cost-sharing arrangement, the
tortious activity would not take place (as Example 2 illustrates). In
other cases, the cost-sharing arrangement entices the parties to
behave tortiously by promising to increase their expected profits. 25

21. Id. § 46 at 323.
22. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT LIAB.
note (AM. LAW INST. 2000).

§ 15

reporters'

23. Lyons v. Premo Pharm. Labs, Inc., 406 A.2d 185, 190 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1979); see also Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 343 N.W.2d 164, 176 n.19
(Mich. 1984) (noting that concerted action "seems to have developed to deter
hazardous group behavior").
24. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT LIAB. § 15; DOBBS,
supra note 15, § 170, at 413; KEETON ET AL., supra note 8, § 52, at 346.

25. For example, suppose that in Example 2 each driver values a speedy
careless ride at $130. Each driver would drive carelessly for an expected gain of
$30 (130-100). If, however, instead of a speedy ride the two drivers agree to
race, each can expect $80 (130-100/2)-more than double the gain. See also
infra Subpart I.B.2.
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Of course, a default sharing provision must also be enforceable.
This is the subject of the next feature of the tort-tract.
2.

Enforcement and Expectation Damages

Tort law allows the non-breaching wrongdoer who performed
and injured another to recover expectation damages from those who
promised to partake or finance the tortious activity and then
recoiled. This means that in Example 2, if D1 hit the victim but D2
did not, D1 would have recourse against D2. Bierczynski v. Rogers 26
illustrates tort law's enforcement function. Bierczynski and Race
were driving side-by-side at excessive speeds while each was
attempting to block the other from passing. 27 Race did not stop in
time and hit the plaintiffs' vehicle. 28
Bierczynski was more
successful and was able to stop thirty-five feet from the area of
impact. 29 Despite the absence of an explicit or verbal agreement,
the court inferred that the parties agreed to race and held both
liable. 30 Bierczynski appealed, but Race did not. 3 1 In fact, Racethe injurer-joined the plaintiffs' request to uphold the judgment
against both.32 This turn of events is hardly surprising. Race-the
injuring party-(successfully) enforced a tort-tractual obligation.
His goal was to enforce a promise that his liability will be diluted-a
promise Bierczynski was willing to make before the accident, but
refused to honor thereafter. 33 By holding both liable (as Race
requested), tort law enforced a cost-sharing provision Bierczynski
and Race adopted when they agreed to race. 34
3.

Curbing Strategic Behaviors

In Bierczynski, the parties were driving in plain view of one
another. 35 They could thus be sure that in case of an injury,
concerted action would apply and both would share the cost of the
victim's harm. But suppose that after the race started, the parties
could no longer see each other. Each driver would be concerned that
26. 239 A.2d 218 (Del. 1968).
27. Id. at 221.
28. Id. at 220.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 221.
31. Id. at 219.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 220.
34. Bierczynski is not an exception.
Its holding has repeatedly been
reaffirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court and was adopted in many
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Riggott v. Bartlett, No. CV 920514789S, 1995 WL
780941, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 1995) (citing Bierczynski and decisions
from other jurisdictions); Tilghman v. Del. State Univ., No. K1OC-10-022 WLW,
2014 WL 1156242, at *6 (Del. Super. Mar. 4, 2014); Kuczynski v. McLaughlin,
835 A.2d 150, 156 (Del. Super. 2003).
35. Bierczynski, 239 A.2d at 220 (stating that "the Race and Bierczynski
automobiles were only 'inches apart"').
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if she harmed another, the non-injuring driver would be able to
escape liability. This could happen if the non-injuring driver
abandoned the race before the injury occurred. In such a case, the
non-injuring driver can argue that concerted action theory does not
apply because at the time of the injury, the parties "were not
pursuing a common plan." 36 The Drivers' Dilemma is illustrated in

Example 2 (summarized in Table 1, below). There, each prefers to
keep racing if the other one does the same for a benefit of $10 (60100/2), but to abandon the race otherwise (-40=60-100).37 Game
theory teaches that, without a clear strategy, the parties may avoid
racing altogether or abandon the race the moment they lose sight of
each other.
TABLE 1: THE DRIVERS' DILEMMA

D1

Abandon
the Race

D2
Abandon the Race
F1 F2
0 0
F1 F2
-40 0

Race
F1 F2
0 -40
F1 F2
10 10

An enforceable commitment to race and keep racing until the
finish line, or to share the cost of the injury even if one abandons the
race, can solve the dilemma. And this is what tort law ensures the

parties do. Saisa v. Lilja3 8 is an example of such a case. In Saisa,
the defendant argued that although he raced with the injurer, he
should not have been held liable because "he had abandoned the
race some time before [the accident]," and that he "was not in the
vicinity of the accident at the time when it occurred." 39 The
appellate court rejected the argument. 40 It held that a person who
pre-commits to share the cost of an injury, either explicitly so or by
agreeing to join the tortious activity, would be held to his promise. 41
The holding assures the injuring driver who "did not know that
36. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. The concern is real. In
fact, in many racing cases the non-injuring driver argues that she abandoned
the race before the other driver injured the victim, that for this very reason
concerted action cannot apply, and that therefore, only the injuring driver
should be held liable. See, e.g., infra notes 39, 44.
37. If both parties are in pursuit of each other, they will be considered
parties to a common plan, concerted action will apply, and both will be held
liable. In such a case, each can expect to pay $50 (100/2), and thus gain $10
(60-50). If one party races and the other does not (e.g., because she decided to
abandon the race without notice), the injurer can expect to lose $40 (60-100).
38. 76 F.2d 380 (1st Cir. 1935).
39. Id. at 381.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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defendant had withdrawn and supposed that the race was still
on . . . [that] the defendant would be liable." 4 2 In Lemons v. Kelly, 43
another drag-race decision, the court left no place for a doubt: "[O]ne
who participates in setting in motion . .. hazardous conduct [like a
drag race] . . . cannot later be heard to say, 'Oh! I withdrew before
harm resulted even though no one else was aware of my
withdrawal."'

44

The result is puzzling. Why does tort law hold liable those who
behaved carefully at the time of the injury (e.g., the defendants in
Saisa and Lemons)? Should not the withdrawing party be praised
and rewarded for abandoning what is clearly an illegal and tortious
activity?4 5 Here, tort law protects the injurer's expectations. In
Saisa and Lemons, it was the non-injuring party's commitment to
participate in the race that allowed the injuring driver to expect a
diluted liability (e.g., 100/2 instead of 100) and enticed her to engage
in the race in the first place (e.g., 60>50). Even after the race has
started, a party may abandon so long as she provides a proper
notice. 46 The notified driver may decide to keep driving carelessly,
but she cannot rely on others to share the cost of an injury.
Abandoning the race without notifying the other driver, however, is
a breach of the commitment to share. Tort law would not accept
this. The remedy provided by tort law is to hold the non-injuring
party to her promise-that is, to require her to share with the
injurer the burden of the victim's injury. 47

42. Id. (affirming the district court's jury instructions).
43. 397 P.2d 784 (Or. 1964).
44. Id. at 787.
45. The holding appears to be more puzzling when it becomes clear that, in
some cases, if the parties knew that only the injurer would be held liable, the
tort would not take place at all. For instance, in Example 1 (defamation), the
only reason that D2, the owner of the newspaper, published the defamatory
statement was because she could count on tort law to hold Dl, the non-injuring
party, liable as well. If tort law imposed liability only on the injurer (or if it
imposed high enough punitive damages or used other anti-dilution
mechanisms), D2 would have refused to engage in the tortious activity
(60<100). An analogy to Example 1 would be a case where Example 2 involved
a driver and a passenger or a driver and a spectator. In such a case, if the
driver-the only potential injurer-knows that she will be the only one liable,
she will not engage in the tortious activity (60<100).

By contrast, in Example 2

(a drag race with two drivers), even if tort law imposed liability only on the
injuring driver, each can still expect a $10 gain, assuming that at the beginning
of the race there is an equal probability that one of them will harm the victim.
See also infra note 292 and accompanying text.
46. Boykin v. Bennett, 118 S.E.2d 12, 17 (N.C. 1961) (recognizing that "[a]
participant who abandons the race, to the knowledge of the other participants,
before the accident and injury, may not be held liable"); supra notes 39-45 and
accompanying text.
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (AM. LAw INST. 1979) (asserting

that "[f]or harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another,
one is subject to liability if he (a) does a tortious act in concert with the other
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The tort remedy turns the dilemma into a clear strategy to stay
in the race. The party who remains in the race can expect a gain
(60-100/2). The abandoning party can only expect a loss (0-100/2).48
The result is that although the parties may not be able to trust each
other (they are strangers) or rely on contract law (the agreement is
not enforceable), they can trust tort law to be on their side. 49
Accordingly, a tortious race will take place.
4.
Tort
them on
consider
(Second)

Guidance to Tort-tractors
law even provides guidance to tort-tractors. It counsels
how to commit the perfect tort. If this sounds dubious,
the following illustration provided by the Restatement
of Torts:

A and B are members of a hunting party. Each of them in the
presence of the other shoots across a public road at an animal,
which is negligent toward persons on the road. A hits the
animal. B's bullet strikes C, a traveler on the road. A is
subject to liability to C.50

The problem faced by A and B is the same as the one faced by
the drivers in Example 2.51 Each is worried that the other party
would renege on her commitment and abandon the tortious activity
before the accident occurs. And, without a partner to a common
plan, each is concerned that if she hits the victim, she alone would
be liable for the entire harm. The difference is that in Example 2,
tort law curbs the strategic behavior by adopting a rule that requires
the reneging party to provide a proper notice. 52 In contrast, in the
hunting scenario, tort law-more accurately, drafters of the
Restatement: tort professors and judges-advises the parties on how
to take self-help measures to avoid that problem.5 3 They promise
the wrongdoers that if each of them shoots in the presence of the
other, both will share liability (because both can still be considered
pursuant to a common design with him . . . ."); supra note 25 and accompanying
text.
48. The abandoning party does not gain anything from the tortious activity
(the gain comes from the careless driving) and can therefore only expect to
share the injury, for an expected loss of 100/2.
49. See supra note 13; infra Subpart I.B.2. (explaining how tort law
incentivizes a large number of actors to join the tort-tract).
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. d, illus. 6; id. cmt. a, illus.
2 (explaining that in a drag race, the parties will be clearly viewed as parties to
a common plan if just before the accident "the two cars [were] abreast and both
[were] travelling at dangerous speed."). The first element-"driving abreast"assures each driver that the other party is racing. The second element-"at
dangerous speed"-assures to each that both are driving carelessly. If drivers
follow this advice, they can be sure that concerted action would apply.
51. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
52. See supra notes 7, 25-26 and accompanying text.
53. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. d, illus. 6.
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parties to a common plan). 54 With this "pre-ruling," all the parties
need to do is simply follow the advice of the experts in the field.55
The victim may find consolation in the fact that she will be able to
recover damages.
B.

Tort-tracting

Tort law does more than offer tort-tracts, enforce their terms,
and curb the parties' attempts to escape their obligations. Tort law
also facilitates tort-tracting-the initial act of agreeing or precommitting to engage in wrongdoing or sharing in the cost of an
injury that may occur therefrom. Tort law does so in two important
ways. First, it reduces the parties' transaction costs. The parties do
not need to enter into long negotiations, draft, and enter into a
detailed agreement that would regulate the parties' behavior.
Instead, tort law offers a menu of default opt-in and opt-out
procedures, cost-sharing and apportionment mechanisms, and even
cross-claim waivers between participants. Tort law even allows
parties to quickly and inexpensively agree on the desired precaution
and activity levels. Second, tort law incentivizes actors to join the
tort-tract by promising them higher gains that may increase with
the number of parties.
1.

Opting-In

Tort law allows actors to opt-in and adopt the default contract
proposed by tort law by inexpensive means. The parties do not need
to hire a lawyer or sign a contract. By simply agreeing to commit or
sponsor a tort, the parties adopt a default cost-sharing provision.
And to do that-a wink of an eye or a gesture will suffice. 56 In fact,
the agreement to engage in a tort does not even have to be explicit.
As Bierczynski illustrates, an agreement to race can be inferred from
the parties' behavior (e.g., speeding side-by-side).5 7 Similarly, a
spectator to a drag race can "sign on" to a tort-tract by simply
waiving her hands in agreement.5 8 And in cases of a driver and a

54. Id.
55. By analogy to Examples 1 and 2, if each hunter values the activity at
$60 and the expected harm is $100, both will engage in the activity. If they
follow the Restatement (Second)'s advice, each can expect a gain (60-100/2>0).
56. See, e.g., Mein ex rel. Mein v. Cook, 193 P.3d 790, 792, 794 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2008) (noting that "revving their engines and bantering back and forth"
was "sufficient to support a finding that [the two defendant-drivers] agreed to
race"); Fuscaldo v. Jaiman, No. 12295/04, 2006 WL 1882412, at *1 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. July 7, 2006) (determining that an agreement to race could be inferred from
"the nonverbal communication of revving the engine at numerous traffic lights,
the screeching of tires, engine noises").
57. Bierczynski v. Rogers, 239 A.2d 218, 221 (Del. 1968); see also supranote
50.
58. See, e.g., Hood v. Evans, 126 S.E.2d 898, 900 (Ga. Ct. App. 1962)
(imposing liability to a non-driver who had signaled the start of the race).
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passenger, all that is needed is for the passenger to not object to the
driver's careless behavior, in which case courts conclude that the
passenger acquiesces to the tortious behavior and thereby becomes a
party to the tort-tract. 59
2.
Incentivizing a Large Number of Parties to Join the Torttract
In the above examples, the tortious activities (publishing a false
statement and drag racing) involved only two parties. In many
cases, however, the cost of negotiating with multiple parties can be
very high, and it likely increases with the number of actors. Jones
v. Reynolds, 60 for example, involved a drag race between two drivers
In Kover v. Bremer,62 twenty-six
with 150-300 spectators. 61
defendants were accused of conspiring to publish defamatory
statements about their ordained minister. 63 And in Gosden v.
Louis, 64 seventeen residents

signed on a defamatory statement

accusing the plaintiff of unlawful misconduct.6 5
Tort law incentivizes a large number of parties to join the torttract in two ways. First, it ensures that the initial cost of joining a
tort-tract remains low. 66 Second, under certain conditions, tort law
promises that the benefits of each party would increase as more

59. See, e.g., Sloan v. Fauque, 784 P.2d 895, 896-97 (Mont. 1989) (holding
liable a passenger who voluntarily and knowingly joined the race despite the
passenger's silence); Hathaway v. Eastman, 968 N.Y.S.2d 841, 845 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2013) (a passenger who "knowingly and willingly participated" in a drag
race is precluded from recovery for injuries sustained in the accident), aff'd, 996
N.Y.S.2d 382 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014); Boykin v. Bennett, 118 S.E.2d 12, 17 (N.C.
1961) (stating that "if the injured passenger had knowledge of the race and
acquiesced in it, he cannot recover" but "[a] participant who abandons the race,
to the knowledge of the other participants, before the accident and injury, may
not be held liable").
60. 438 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 2006).
61. Id. at 688.
62. 13 N.E.2d 656 (Ill. App. Ct. 1938).
63. Id. at 657.
64. 687 N.E.2d 481 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
65. Id. at 485; see also Miles v. Perry, 529 A.2d 199, 202 (Conn. App. Ct.
1987) (holding multiple defendants liable for conspiring to defame the plaintiff).
66. A bystander can opt-in to a drag race by simply waiving his hands.
Hood v. Evans, 126 S.E.2d 898, 900 (Ga. Ct. App. 1962). Those who would like
to sponsor the publisher only need to agree or support the publisher. See
Gosden, 687 N.E.2d at 486-87. The agreement can be explicit-as in Gosden,
id., where each of the defendants added their signature to the defamatory
letter--or it can be implicit by way of support or encouragement. See Coffey v.
MacKay, 277 N.E.2d 748, 752 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972) (relying on Kovar for the
preposition that "allegations of a conspiracy ... plus overt actions by [some of
the defendants] are sufficient to state a cause of action for a
conspiracy ... through libel and slander").
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actors join the tortfest. 67 In these cases, the more actors join the
tortious activity, the more profitable and enticing it becomes.68 To
illustrate this, consider a race with two drivers and a spectator who
cannot verbally communicate with the drivers but can initially see
and be seen by them. Perhaps, the spectator is located on the other
side of a highway or at a distant high point.
Example 2A: A Drag Race with Two Drivers and a
Spectator. Each of the three actors, two drivers and a
spectator, benefits $60 from the careless activity. If one or
both drivers drive carelessly, the expected harm to the
victim is $150.
Here, each can expect to gain $10 (60-150/3>0), but only if allthe two drivers and the spectator-share the cost of the accident. If
others joined the group, the imposition of liability on all would serve
as an additional encouragement. For example, with six actors (e.g.,
two drivers and four spectators) each can expect to gain $35 (60150/6); and with fifteen actors (e.g., two drivers and thirteen
spectators), the individual gain will quintuple to $50 (60-150/15).
The result is that by holding all parties liable, tort law promises
that the gain for each will increase as more tortfeasors join the
activity. And to opt-in, all that a spectator needs to do is simply
raise a hand with approval.
3.
Care Levels
Tort law also protects the parties' ex-ante expectations with
regard to the agreed upon levels of care. Tort law does so by
punishing the party who deviates from the tort-tract. To illustrate
this, recall Example 2, but suppose now that the drivers must
choose between different levels of care.
Example 2B: A Drag Race with Varying Levels of
Care. Two strangers, D1 and D2, stop at a red light. They
consider whether to engage in a drag race, which each
values at $60.
If the parties, or one of them, drive
carelessly by way of speeding, the expected harm is $100. A
driver can slow down and avoid harming, but this would
reduce her chances to win and her expected benefit would
drop to $5 (i.e., slowing down comes at a cost of $55). A
reckless bypass in a no-pass zone increases the expected
harm to $200.
Here, each actor has four options: (1) avoid the race; (2) race
with care and expect a gain of $5 (60-55); (3) race carelessly for an
67. See Dillbary, supra note 12, at 958 (defining a tortfest as a case where
dilution of the parties' liability can not only reduce their incentives to take care,
but may also "incentivize actors to join others in committing a wrongdoing").
68. Id.
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expected gain of $10 (60-100/2) if the other driver does the same, or
for a $40 (60-100) loss if the other driver does not; or (4) race
recklessly and suffer a loss regardless of the other's actions. 69 Note
that the first option (no race) and the last one (reckless driving) are
inferior strategies. The first comes with no gain and the latter
promises a loss. The parties' only decision is, therefore, whether to
drive carefully for a sure profit of $5, or drive carelessly and either
double the gain (if both drive carelessly) or risk a loss.
Once again, tort law solves the dilemma in favor of incentivizing
the parties to behave tortiously. Tort law does so by disciplining
those who deviate from the agreed-upon level of care. If two parties
agreed to race carelessly, it will hold liable the injurer as well as the
party who, in breach of her promise, decided to drive carefully. 70
Similarly, the driver who violates the tort-tract by driving recklessly
will be held solely liable for the entire harm inflicted by her
behavior.7 1 The result is that the non-breaching party (i.e., the one
who drives carelessly) can expect that her liability will be
sufficiently diluted to make the tortious activity worthwhile. By
contrast, the party who breaches the tort-tract (by either driving
carefully or recklessly) can only expect a loss. 7 2 By doing so, tort law
assures the injurer that her liability would remain sufficiently
diluted to make the tortious activity worthwhile.
Champion ex rel. Ezzo v. Dunfee73 is illustrative. Dunfee had
been drinking prior to the accident. 74 His girlfriend was aware of
his condition.7 5 By voluntarily joining the ride as a passenger, she
agreed to share the cost of an injury caused to a third party by the
careless driving associated with driving in his condition. But she
did not agree to a reckless ride. In fact, she explicitly objected when
her boyfriend drove at 100 mph in an attempt to prove his car's

69. If both parties share the cost of the reckless behavior each can expect to
lose $40 (60-200/2). If one driver is liable she can expect to lose $140 (60-200).
The term "recklessly," as used here, denotes a substantial deviation from due
care.
70.
71.

See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
A driver may drive recklessly due to an error or if the benefits from

doing so outweigh the cost. For example, assume D2 (but not Dl) values
driving recklessly at $220. In such a case, if D2 harms the victim, she should
expect to be alone liable for an expected a gain of $20 (220-200).
72. The breaching party who drives carefully (without proper notice) does
not gain the $60 benefit that comes with careless driving, but she will
nevertheless have to share the cost of the injury inflicted by the careless party.
This is the teaching of Lemons v. Kelly, 397 P.2d 784, 787 (Or. 1964).
Accordingly, she can expect to lose $50 (0-50). The party who drives recklessly
and injures another can expect to lose even more. She would benefit $60 from
the speedy race, but the reckless race comes with an expected injury of $200.
Accordingly, she can expect to lose $140 (60-200).
73. 939 A.2d 825 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008).
74. Id. at 827.
75. Id. (noting also that "Dunfee's blood alcohol was 0.143%").
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capabilities.7 6 Dunfee lost control, hit a fence and seriously injured
Champion-the rear seat passenger.7 7 Champion sued the driver,
Dunfee, who in turn impleaded his girlfriend.7 8 The court dismissed
the driver's third-party suit against his girlfriend who agreed to
share the cost of a careless, but not reckless, ride. 79 It held liable
only the driver who deviated from the agreed-upon level of care.8 0
The court reached the same result in Keith v. J.A.81 In that
case, both defendants initially engaged in downhill snowboarding at
high speed. 82 One of them then took a position at the side of the hill
to film the other. 83 Upon his signal, the other started snowboarding
and shortly thereafter collided with the plaintiffs wife. 84 The court
dismissed the complaint against the non-injuring (filming) party.85
It held that agreeing to skiing "fast" is not the same as knowing that
the injurer would "ski at a reckless speed," and that there was no
evidence that the filming party encouraged "a reckless speed."86 In
doing so, the court protected the party who may have agreed to
behave carelessly but not recklessly.
Cooper v. Bondoni8 7 stands for the proposition that a party who
agreed to a reckless ride will have to share its cost as promised. In
Cooper, four passengers provided the driver with alcoholic beverages
and urged him to bypass a truck while driving uphill in a marked
no-passing zone.8 8 While on the wrong side of the road the car
collided with a motorcyclist, causing him severe injuries. 89 The
Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals held all four passengers liable. 90
It did not allow those who agreed to share the cost of a reckless ride
to escape their tort-tractual obligation.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts makes a similar point by
contrasting two hypotheticals. In the first, A helps B to burglarize
C's safe. 91 B breaks in and "without A's knowledge ... burns [C's]

76. Id. ("[The girlfriend] repeatedly told Dunfee to slow down: First when
he reached seventy m.p.h., [she] said, '[T]hat's enough, you proved your point.'
Then when Dunfee approached 100 m.p.h., [she] again told him to slow down.
A third time, she cursed at him.").
77. Id.
7 8. Id.
79. See id. at 834.
80. Id. at 833-34.
81. 295 F. App'x 309 (10th Cir. 2008).
82. Id. at 311.
83. Id. at 310.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 313.
86. Id. at 311.
87. 841 P.2d 608 (Okla. Civ. App. 1992).
88. Id. at 609.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 612.
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. d, illus. 10 (AM. LAW. INST.
1979).
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In the second
house in order to conceal the burglary." 92
hypothetical, A helps B to trespass into Us land so B can recapture
chattel belonging to B.93 While B is on Us property, she also burns
C's house. 94 The Restatement (Second) notes that A is liable only in
the first case but not in the second. 95 It explains that the difference
between the two cases is that in the trespassing case, the tortious
act was "not foreseeable by [A]."96 In other words, the claim is that
in the second scenario, setting the house on fire was not part of the
tort-tract into which the parties entered, just as in Example 2B and
Dunfee, driving recklessly was not part of the tort-tract.
Note that the analysis in these cases is made in two steps.
First, contract law principles are employed to determine the scope of
the parties' obligations. In the second step, tort law enforces the
agreement.
The first part of the analysis-the contractual
interpretation-is often the focus of the litigation. For example, one
could agree with the Restatement that by aiding B to trespass on C's
land, A did not agree to share C's damages. Another could argue
with equal force that in both hypotheticals, A could have reasonably
foreseen that C's property would be damaged. And if so, by agreeing
to help B in both cases, A also agreed to share the cost of C's injury.
The parties can mitigate the problem by simply clarifying their
intentions. For example, A could have clarified that, by providing a
97
cutter to B, she is only willing to share the damage to C's fence.
4.

Waivers

In some cases, tort law also provides a default waiver that binds
all those who agree to participate in a tortious activity. Under this
boilerplate arrangement, an injured party cannot recover from the
other participants if she agreed to participate in the tortious
activity. Thus, if a driver or a passenger was injured during a race
she agreed to, she cannot recover from the injurer. 98 On the other

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 876 cmt. d, illus. 11.

Id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. d, illus. 10-11.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. d.

97. See Lussier v. Bessette, 16 A.3d 580 (Vt. 2010). In Lussier, the court
explained that under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 cmt. a, illus. 2,
where two drivers, A and B, decide to race, the non-injuring driver, "B, is
liable . . . because, based on his knowledge of the situation, the particular harm
which occurred-a collision caused by a drag race-was foreseeable." Id. at 584.
In contrast, "if A had told B the road was closed for their drag race, their actions
could not be concerted and B would not be liable, because the harm would not
have been foreseeable under the conditions known to B." Id. (emphasis added).
98. See, e.g., Bugh v. Webb, 328 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Ark. 1959) (holding that a
passenger who was aware of the hazard involved in a race and "had an
opportunity to make a protest of some nature but wholly failed to do so"
assumed the risk and is barred from recovery); Riggott v. Bartlett, No. CV
920514789S, 1995 WL 780941, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 1995) (holding
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hand, if in deviation from the agreement the injurer behaved more
carelessly than the parties agreed to, the court would hold liable
only the breaching party. This is illustrated in Bogle v. Conway.99
Bogle, a passenger who agreed and even convinced the driver to
participate in a race, sued both drivers for harm caused to him by
their reckless behavior. 100 The trial court found that Bogle agreed to
a careless ride. 101 But he did not agree to race side-by-side, uphill,
in a marked no-passing zone at ninety miles per hour which resulted
in a collision with a third party. 102 The trial court found that both
drivers were grossly negligent: the first for trying to pass and the
other for failing to reduce his speed. 103 On appeal, the drivers
contended that the suit should be barred because Bogle agreed to
participate in the race and assumed the risk associated with it.104
The Supreme Court of Kansas disagreed. 105 It held that although
Bogle agreed to join the race as a passenger, "there is no evidence
that Bogle consented to anything as suicidal as what actually
occurred." 106 In other words, Bogle agreed to a careless, but not a
reckless, race. As a result, his suit was not barred, and both drivers
were held liable for the entire harm. 107
5.

Apportionment

The default agreement offered by tort law (compliments of
courts and legislatures) promises that the parties will share
liability.10 8 It also promises that the cost of the accident will be
apportioned according to some announced and predetermined

that "one racer is not responsible for the safety of another racer"); Hathaway v.
Eastman, 968 N.Y.S.2d 841, 843, 845 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013) (holding that
regardless of comparative fault, a passenger who voluntarily participated and
was injured in a race cannot recover from the other participants); Lewis v.
Miller, 543 A.2d 590, 592 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (holding that a driver who was
killed while racing recklessly, uphill, at excessive speed cannot recover from the
other driver); Parrott v. Garcia, 428 S.W.2d 476, 478 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968),
aff'd, 436 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. 1969) (holding that a driver who was injured during
a race by other participants cannot recover and noting that the same rule
applies in other states).
99. 422 P.2d 971 (Kan. 1967).
100. Id. at 972. The action was brought by Bogle's parents who sought to
recover damages for his wrongful death. Id.
101. Id. at 973.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 973-74.
105. Id. at 976.
106. Id. at 975 (emphasis added).
107. Id. at 975-76; see also Bierczynski v. Rogers, 239 A.2d 218, 221 (Del.
1968) ("It is also generally held that all who engage in a race on the highway do
so at their peril, and are liable for injury or damage sustained by a third person
as a result thereof, regardless of which of the racing cars directly inflicted the
injury or damage.") (emphasis added).
108. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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rule. 109 For example, a jurisdiction that applies several liability
makes each party liable to the victim directly based on some
percentage of fault determined by the jury (which ex-ante should be
presumed as 50%).110 A jurisdiction that applies joint and several
liability with a right of contribution would allow the party who fully
paid the victim to recover a portion of the damages from the other
party to the tort-tract.1 1 1
6.

Termination Provision

The agreement offered and enforced by tort law also includes a
default termination provision.
It allows parties to abandon or
terminate the careless behavior to which they committed without
fear of liability. 112 But only if the party who wants to opt out
communicates that to the other parties before it's too late-that is,
at a time when the other tort-tractors can do the same. This is the
teaching of cases like Saisa1 l 3 and Lemons. 114
C.

Benefit-SharingAgreements

In the
commitment
interests by
tract. 115 In

previous examples, concerted action served as a
device that allowed the parties to maximize their
entering into a contract enforced by tort law, a tortother cases, concerted action would fail to serve as a

109. For an analysis of the different apportionment regimes and their
effects, see generally Dillbary, supra note 9.
110. See infra Part III. F.
111. See, e.g., Ogle v. Avina, 146 N.W.2d 422, 426 (Wis. 1966) ("In a race, the
participants share equally the responsibility for damage done by any
participant."); see also Dillbary, supra note 9, at 1743-44 (explaining that
Alabama is the only jurisdiction that does not recognize a right of contribution,
but even in such a jurisdiction the parties can expect to pay 50% of the
damage).

112. See supranotes 38-45 and accompanying text.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. A tort-tract can be welfare enhancing but, for some, the conclusion may
depend on the nature of the activity. Some economists take the view that a
liability rule can be justified, even if the underlying activity may seem
reprehensive, provided that the injurers value the activity more than the harm
they inflict on the victim and that other conditions are met. See RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 102, 264, 274 (Vickin Been et al. eds., 9th
ed. 2014) (explaining that economics gives the same weight to the utility of the
wrongdoer and the victim). See generally George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker,
De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM. EcoN. REV. 76 (1977). Others
believe that the nature of the activity is important in determining its value.
For example, Judge Posner argued that the subjective value criminals receive
"though perhaps great, is not the kind of benefit that has weight in the scales
when on the other side is danger to life and limb." Boim v. Holy Land Found.
for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 695 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that, based on tort
law principals, financial contribution to a terrorist group gives rise to liability
under the Anti-Terrorist Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331(1), 2333 (2012) (citing United
States v. Boyd, 475 F.3d 875, 877 (7th Cir. 2007)); see THOMAS J. MICELI, THE
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credible commitment device. This can happen in situations where
an agreement that would maximize the parties' payoffs requires
that the parties share the benefits of their common enterprise. To
see why, consider the following variation of Example 1.
Example lA: Defamation and Benefits Sharing. D1
values harming P at $120. D1 promises to pay D2, the
owner of a newspaper, $60 after she publishes a statement
about P known to both to be libelous. 116 Ps expected harm
is $100. After D2 publishes the statement, D1 refuses to
pay D2.
A commitment to pay D2 is necessary to induce her to commit
the wrong. 117 However, D2 knows that if she performs and D1
refuses to pay her, she will not be able to recover her $60
expectation damages. In the eyes of contract law, the agreement is
unenforceable. Tort law will also fail to provide D2 with a remedy.
The agreement to act tortiously results in a tort-tract to share the
cost of Ps harm. This means that if D2 publishes the statement, she
can expect to bear only half of the damages, $50. But tort law does
not provide any benefit-sharing mechanism. Knowing this, D2 will
ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 75 (2004) ("[I]n some cases the benefit to the
injurer of inflicting harm may exceed the cost to the victim, but the benefit is
not socially valuable."); Gary Schwartz, Economics, Wealth Distribution, and
Justice, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 799, 807 (1979) (noting "the pleasure of [certain
criminal acts] . . . should not be given any weight at all."); see also Guido
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1125 (1972)
(warning that compensating the victim with "an objectively determined
value . . . would be to convert all property rule entitlements into liability rule
entitlements"

and

warning

that

"[1]iability

rules

represent

only

an

approximation of the value of the object to [the victim]"); Jules Coleman, Crime,
Kickers, and Transaction Structures, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE: NOMOS XXVII 313
(J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1985) (criticizing the economic
analysis of crime); infra Part III.G (discussing the efficiency-morality debate).
116.

D1 will never pay D2 upfront because in such a case D2 will keep the

proceeds and will not publish the statement for a profit of $60, compared to $10
(60-100/2) if she does. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 197 cmt. a
illus. 1 (AM. LAW. INST. 1981) (providing a similar example to show that, as a
general matter, a party who agreed to commit or induce the commission of a
tort has no claim in restitution). A claim in restitution may nevertheless be
available if the party asking for restitution "withdraws from the transaction
before the [tortious act is committed]." Id. § 199(a); see also Greenberg v.

Evening Post Ass'n, 99 A. 1037, 1039 (Conn. 1917) ("[Iln an action to recover
back money paid for the purpose of carrying out a proposed illegal or immoral

design, the plaintiff may recover upon proof that he reasonably repented of his
bargain, and evidenced such repentance by repudiating the arrangement with
reasonable promptness and before the other party had so far acted in
performance of it as to carry any part of the illegal or immoral design into

effect.").
117. Without such a commitment D2 can only expect to share the cost of P's
injury and incur a $50 (100/2) loss. By contrast, if she can trust D1 to pay, D2
can expect a gain (60>100/2).
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not enter into an agreement with D1 to begin with, and
consequently the tortious activity will not occur.
The main difference between Examples 1 and 1A is that in
Example 1, both parties benefited directly from the activity. Both
had a feud with P and each valued harming P at $60. In Example 1,
defamation has a "public good" aspect-at least in the eyes of the
tortfeasors-in the sense that the act of one benefits the others. 118
By contrast, in Example 1A, only D1 benefits from the activity
($120), and, absent a benefit-sharing mechanism, D1 cannot entice
D2 to commit the harm.
Still, a tort-tract can encourage parties with different valuations
to commit a tort by increasing the expected benefits to the parties.
This can be illustrated if in Example 1, D1 valued harming P at $80
and D2 valued harming P at $30. For convenience, the modified
example is reprinted below.
Example
1B:
Defamation
and
Parties
with
Heterogeneous Valuations. D1 and D2 value harming
their neighbor P at $80 and $30 respectively. D1 asks D2,
who owns a newspaper, to publish a statement about P
known to both to be false and defamatory. The expected
harm to P is $100.
Here, an agreement between D1 and D2 will result in a torttract, but D2 will not publish the statement. If she does, she can
expect to pay $50 (100/2), enjoy a benefit of $30, and thus lose $20
(30-50). Unlike Example 1A, here, tort law does provide a solution.
All the parties need to do is to find two additional actors to join the
tort-tract. For example, suppose that as in Kovar1 19 and Gosden 120
the parties convince others, D3 and D4, to also agree to share Ps
harm. With the aid of concerted action theory, all four would be
held liable as joint-tortfeasors who pursued a common plan. As a
result, the expected liability of D2 will be diluted to $25 (100/4).
Now publishing the statement becomes profitable (30>25).
The
point is that so long as some benefits accrue to the parties, tort law
can encourage a wrongdoing provided that enough parties join the
tort-tract.

118. See POSNER, supra note 115, at 402 (defining a public good as "a good
that can be consumed without reducing any other person's consumption of it").
Similarly, when two drivers race, each confers a benefit upon the other and
upon interested bystanders and passengers. The passengers and bystanders
also benefit the other participants by promising them a lower expected liability
and higher gains. Under certain conditions, these gains will increase further as
more participants (drivers, passengers, and bystanders) join the activity.

119.
120.

Kovar v. Bremer, 13 N.E.2d 656, 657 (Ill. App. Ct. 1938).
Gosden v. Louis, 687 N.E.2d 481, 485 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
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II. OTHER COMMITMENT DEVICES

In the examples above, an agreement was a necessary
commitment device. The parties entered into a contract that tort
law enforced with the help of theories like concerted action. When
the parties cannot negotiate, tort law allows them to enter into a
tort-tract in a different way. The parties do not need to agree to
commit a tort. Instead, each can act independently and unilaterally
signal her commitment to engage in or sponsor the tortious activity.
In these cases, tort law ensures that the signal is credible by forcing
those who misrepresented their intentions to pay the injurer
expectation damages. Tort law does so with the help of causation
theories like substantial factor and alternative liability.
A.

Signaling by Way of Contribution to the Harm and Sampling

1.
Substantial Factor as a Means to Enforce Tort-tractors'
Representations
To see how substantial factor doctrine serves as a credible
signaling device that encourages actors to engage in tortious
activities, consider the following example:
Example 3: Campers. Each of five campers, C1-C5,
values setting a fire at $20 and can take care at a cost of
$50. A camper that acts carelessly would set a fire that
alone could destroy the victim's $90 cabin.121
One, two, three or even four campers will not engage in the
activity because the expected liability of each (90, 90/2, 90/3, 90/4
respectively) will outweigh the $20 expected private benefit.1 22 But
five campers would be very much interested in engaging in the
activity, provided they all behave carelessly. 123 In such case, each
can expect a gain of $2 (20-90/5).
Tort law, this time with the aid of doctrines like substantial
124
factor, helps the would-be-injurers to fulfill their aspirations.
121.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL

HARM § 27 cmt. a, illus. 1 (AM. LAW. INST. 2005) (providing a similar example).
122. The activity will be considered tortious if it is subject to strict liability.
Even under a negligence regime, the parties may be held liable. As previously
explained elsewhere, in applying the Hand formula, a court may engage in an
individual cost-benefit analysis. See J. Shahar Dillbary, CausationActually, 51
U. GA. L. REV 1, 21-22 (2016). In Example 3, it would compare the $50 cost of
the precaution to the $90 harm to the victim and determine that taking care
was cost justified.
123. Neither camper will take care because the cost of taking care is higher
than the benefit therefrom (50>20).
124. For a different explanation that is based on a fairness rationale, see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM

§

27

cmt. c (arguing that holding all parties liable "comports with deep-seated
intuitions about causation and fairness in attributing responsibility").
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Tort law does so by promising the parties that if they commit to
acting carelessly (by contributing to the harm), they will all be held
liable. 125 The imposition of liability does two things. First, it
ensures that the activity will take place only if it is, at least initially,
cost-justified. In the above example, it ensures that four campers
will not engage in the activity (20x4<90) but five would (20x5>90).
Second, by ensuring that all will share the victim's harm, each of the
five campers can expect a gain (20-90/5>0), which will increase with
the number of tort-tractors. Importantly, substantial factor entices
the parties to tort-tract at low costs. The parties do not need to even
agree with each other to behave tortiously (if they do, they would be
considered tort-tractors by way of concerted action). They simply
need to behave carelessly. As I showed elsewhere, 126 each camper
can also be considered a but-for cause of the harm. Indeed, but for
each of the campers' engaging carelessly in the activity, the other
four campers would not have engaged in the activity either, and the
victim's cabin would have been spared. 127
2.

Exempting Non-InjuringPartiesfrom Liability

Unlike concerted action theory or its sister, alternative liability,
the substantial factor doctrine holds liable only those who
contributed to the victim's harm. 128 It does not hold liable those who
could have contributed to the harm but did not (as in the case of the
non-injuring driver in Bierczynskil29 or the non-injuring hunter in
Summers130).
The tort-tractual rationale provided in this Article explains
what may seem as an anomaly. Reconsider Example 3, above. One
could conclude that the law of causation is perhaps too limited.
Note that the example did not require that the campers' fires
actually merged. 13 1 Indeed, the act of merging seems unnecessary.

125. Id. § 27 (stating that where there are multiple causes, "each act is
regarded as a factual cause of the harm."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
432 (Am. Law Inst. 1965) (applying the substantial factor test); Id. § 433A(2)
cmt. i ("Where two or more causes combine to produce such a single result,
incapable of division on any logical or reasonable basis, and each is a
substantial factor in bringing about the harm . .. each of the causes is charged
with responsibility for the entire harm."); DOBBS, supra note 15, § 171, at 415;
KEETON ET AL., supra note 8, § 41, at 267-68.
126. Dillbary, supra note 122, at 22.
127. The result does not change if five or more campers engage in the
activity. See id.; infra Part III.A.
128. See Dillbary, supra note 122, at 22.
129. Bierczynski v. Rogers, 239 A.2d 218, 221 (Del. 1968); see supra notes
26-34 and accompanying text.

130. Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1948) (holding liable two hunters
who shot carelessly at the direction of the victim although it was clear that only
one of them hit the victim).
131. If they did, they would be easily identified as a substantial factor, a
Necessary Element of a Sufficient Set ("NESS") and, as this Article argues, also
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Even if only one fire reached the victim's cabin and destroyed it, one
can argue that all tortious campers should be considered a but-for
cause of the harm. To see why, assume that of the five fires set
tortiously, only the one set by C5 actually reached the cabin and
destroyed it. Perhaps it was because the fires set by Cl-C4
unexpectedly arrived at the cabin when it was already destroyed, or
that C5s fire blocked the other fires from reaching the house by
removing trees necessary to Cl-C4's path of destruction. Although
only one fire, the one set by C5, contributed to the harm, each of the
independent actors is still a but-for cause of the harm. The reason is
that neither camper would alone set a fire (20<50, 90). Each camper
was willing to set a fire only if the other four campers would do the
same. By taking the irreversible necessary steps to set a fire, each
camper made a representation that she was willing to share the cost
of the harm. This meant that each could expect a diluted liability of
$18 (90/5) and thus a $2 profit (20-18).132 In other words, but-for
C1-C4's representations-visibly setting their fires tortiously-C5,
the actual injurer, would not have done the same and the victim
would not be harmed. It was the recognition that a certain number
of campers tortiously set a fire, and the reliance that all would share
the cost, that formed the actual injurer's ex-ante expectations and
convinced her to set the injuring fire.
The situation of non-merging fires is thus similar to the drivers'
case (Example 2) where one of the careless drivers injured the
victim, but both are considered a cause of the harm. Why then does
substantial factor theory limit the pool of defendants to those whose
fires reached the house and contributed to the harm? The reasons
are grounded in pragmatism and economic considerations.
a. Calibrating the Tort-tractors' Ex-Ante Expectations. One
reason for limiting the pool of defendants to those whose fires
contributed to the harm is to force actors to carefully calibrate their
ex-ante expectations.
The narrow pool of defendants also
incentivizes the parties to engage in the tortious activities when it is
(at least at first approximation) cost-justified to do so. It forces each
actor to rely on the others' careless behavior only if she believes with
enough certainty the other's action would contribute to the harm.
Suppose C5 knows that a fire set by C1 is unlikely to reach the cabin
or contribute to the harm. Substantial factor theory advises C5 to
exempt from her cost-benefit calculus Cl's actions. It announces
that she can expect to pay only 1/4 of the victim's harm. As a result,
a but-for cause of the harm. For an explanation of the NESS test, see Richard
W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1735, 1788-1803 (1985).
The test was recently adopted by the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR
PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2010).

132. This assumes that each expected that the fires will merge at a very
high degree of likelihood.
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C5 would avoid the tortious activity-the socially desirable result.
In other words, only a commitment by way of contributing to the
harm can be considered a credible representation on which the
injurer may rely.
Those who believe that efficiency requires that the actors
behave carelessly may be concerned that C5 may be over-deterred.
The argument could be that, if C5 were so worried that her liability
would not be sufficiently diluted, she would avoid the activity when
she should not. However, this would only entice actors (when
possible) to enter into agreements to engage in tortious activities.
Such agreements would provide a "peace of mind" to the tortfeasors
by defining with certainty the pool of liable parties.
These
agreements could, under certain conditions, be welfare enhancing. 133
If C1-C5 agree to act in concert, because all would be liable (e.g.,
under concerted action theory), their aggregate private benefits
must outweigh the harm.
b.
Moral Hazard. Another reason for substantial factor's
insistence on contribution to the harm is to curb a moral hazard
concern and avoid unnecessary and wasteful litigation. To illustrate
this, suppose that C5 values the activity at $100. In such a case, she
would act-even if she believes that she is the sole camper-for an
expected gain of $10 (100-90). If, after the accident occurs, she can
also pin liability on C1-C4, she would increase her gain by more
than eightfold to $82 (100-90/5). Moreover, the injurer would likely
seek to implead any actors who set a fire, arguing that their actions
were tortious (and thus entered her cost-benefit calculus). She
would do so even if she was not, and could not be, aware of their
actions at the time of injury. The substantial factor mitigates such
attempts by allowing the injurer to recover only from those who
made an actual contribution.
3.

Sampling and the "Substantiality"Requirement

In concurrent causes cases, the contribution made by each
careless actor is a crucial ingredient in the tort-tract.
It is a
representation that credibly communicates the careless actor's
willingness to share the cost of the harm. The signal is credible
because tort law allows those who relied on the representation to
recover their expectation damages against a reneging party. This
insight explains why those who only contributed trivially to the
harm may be exempted from liability. This exemption can occur if
the actor engaged in sampling to determine whether enough actors

133. Assuming, among other things, that tort-tractor's private benefits are
given weight, that damages are set at the correct level, and that expected cost
from overinvestment in care and underinvestment in capital would not be
prohibitive.
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are willing to engage in a tortious activity. To illustrate, consider
the following example.
Forces
Example
3A:
Multiple
Contributions. Five farmers, Fl-F5, are
$90 lake.
The lake will be destroyed
pollution are released. Each farmer can
polluting activities (e.g., raising chickens)
activities (e.g., growing corn).

Trivial
and
located next to a
if 100 units of
either engage in
or pollution-free

First, suppose that each farmer values a certain polluting
activity (e.g., raising chickens) at $20 and can avoid harming the
Four farmers will not pollute
lake if she installs a $50 filter.
because they can only expect a loss (20-90/4<0). But if a fifth joins
them and is also held liable, all would raise chickens (and pollute)
because the diluted liability (90/5) would promise each a $2 gain
(20-90/5).134 Note that in this case, each farmer is a but-for reason
for the harm. Indeed, if one farmer did not join the activity, none
would pollute and the lake would be spared. This is true regardless
of the number of pollutants released by each. If F1 released 100
units of pollution and F2-F5 10,000 units, each of Fl-F5 is still a
but-for cause of the harm.
Fl-F5 are better off engaging in the polluting activity, but it is
not clear that they will. The problem is that none of the farmers
know: (1) what the other farmers plan to do with their land (e.g.,
raise chickens and pollute or grow corn instead); (2) the level of their
activity and thus pollution (e.g., whether each will raise 100 or 1000
chickens;) and (3) their subjective valuations (e.g., whether each
values the polluting activity at $20 or another amount).
Each
farmer would be concerned that if only a small number of farmers
act tortiously, her liability will not be sufficiently diluted. The
result is a Farmers' Dilemma reminiscent of the Drivers'
Dilemma13 5 : each farmer is better off raising chickens if at least four
other farmers do the same, but growing corn otherwise.
One way to avoid the Farmers' Dilemma is by way of
negotiations. If the parties can, they will enter into an agreement to
behave carelessly. 136 But what if the farmers cannot agree? As with
the Drivers' Dilemma, tort law solves the Farmers' Dilemma in
favor of behaving tortiously. It does so by allowing each of them to
"test the ground" by way of sampling. Each farmer can release an
insubstantial number of pollutants (e.g., by raising only a small

134. Assuming the benefits from the alternative activity (i.e., raising corn)
are lower.
135. See supra Subpart I.A.3.
136. The agreement does not need to reveal the farmers' reservation prices
or the nature of their operation. The agreement itself implies that each values
a tortious activity more than her expected diluted liability (or they will not
agree to act tortiously).

CONTRACTING FOR TORTS

2017]

1083

number of chickens) to see if others would do the same. For
example, assume that after F1 released an insubstantial number of
units, F2-F5 followed suit. In such a case, if each farmer values the
activity at $20, all would incrementally increase their activity levels
(e.g., raise more chickens), continue to pollute, and expect a profit.
If the lake is destroyed, substantial factor theory will hold all liable
and ensure that each pays only 1/5 of the harm for an expected gain
of $2 (20-90/5).
Suppose now that F6 values the tortious activity at $11. First
note that F6 will not engage in the activity unless joined by at least
eight other farmers. In such case, she can expect a gain (1190/9>0).137

Here, if F6 started producing on a low scale (and thus

released a trivial amount of pollutants), Fl-F5 would do the same.
If no other farmers join the group, F6 would cease its operation to
avoid a loss and switch to a non-tortious activity (e.g., raising corn).
By contrast, Fl-F5 will continue polluting. For them, it is enough
that the cost of the lake is split five ways (20-90/5>0).138

The

substantial factor doctrine allows sampling by exempting from
liability F6, who contributed only trivially to the harm.
Sampling is more likely to occur if the law exempts from
liability the sampler who found that the activity is not worthwhile
(F6 in the latter example). The Restatement (Second) of Torts
encourages sampling in two ways. First, it imposes liability only on
Relevant
those who contributed substantially to the harm.
considerations include "(a) the number of actors which contribute to
the harm and the extent of the effect which they have in producing
it"; (b) whether the actor's conduct was "continuous and active
operation up to the time of the harm"; and (c) the "lapse of time."1 39
This allows the sampler who polluted only trivially at an early point
in time to scale back and cease the activity without being held liable.
Second, the Restatement (Second) is willing to exempt from liability
an actor whose contribution was a "relatively small and insignificant
part to the total harm." 140

Similarly, the Restatement (Third) of

Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm exempts from
liability an actor whose "negligent conduct constitutes only a trivial
contribution." 141 "The exception applies only when there are
multiple sufficient causes and the tortious conduct at issue
142
constitutes a trivial contribution to any sufficient causal set."

137. Assuming, again, that the non-tortious activity is less profitable.
138. F6 may, of course, be happy to resume the polluting activity once the
lake is destroyed. In such a case, a free riding concern may develop. For
possible solutions, see Dillbary, supra note 12, at 958.
139. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433 (AM. LAw INST. 1965).
140. Id. § 433B cmt. e.
141.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL

HARM § 36 (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
142. Id. § 36 cmt. b.
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The exemption provided by the Restatement (Second) and
Restatement (Third) of Torts may be too broad, destabilize the
parties' expectations and result in suboptimal activity levels. For
example, suppose that F1 released 100 units of pollutants-the
minimum amount of pollutant that would destroy the lake-but
each of F2-F5 released 10,000 units.
A court following the
aforementioned Restatements may conclude that, because Fl's
contribution is trivial or insubstantial by comparison to the others,
F1 should be exempted from liability. 14 3 But F2-F5 would not have
engaged in the tortious activity if they had known that F1 would not
be held liable. Moreover, when F1 decided to continue with her
operation beyond mere sampling, she could not have known that her
contribution would be that trivial compared to the other. And
accordingly, she could not have known that she would be exempted.
Each of F1-F5 joined the tort-tract because she relied on the fact
that her liability would be sufficiently diluted. The exemption
should thus be applied with much caution. It should not apply to
committed actors: those who engaged in more than sampling.
4.

Tortious and Non-Tortious Forces

An important area of controversy between the Restatement
(Second) and the Restatement (Third) of Torts and one this Article
can illuminate, is the case of duplicate forces, where one of the
forces is non-tortious. Suppose, for example, that two fires-one set
carelessly by a camper and another caused by a lightning strikemerged and destroyed the victim's cabin. Both Restatements would
conclude that the tortious actor is a (substantial factor,144 a
sufficient force, or a necessary element of a sufficient set) 145 cause of
143. Id. § 36 cmt. a (explaining that an actor may be exempted from liability
when "the actor's negligence, while a member of a causal set sufficient to
produce the harm, pales by comparison to the other contributions"); id. cmt. b
(noting that, in general, the trivial contribution limitation "will apply when the
causal contribution of various actors is susceptible to being compared on a
common metric, such as quantity of comparable pollution or of toxic
substances"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433 (emphasizing as a
consideration the fact that actor's conduct is "unsubstantial as compared to the
aggregate of the other factors which have contributed.").
144. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2) ("If two forces are actively
operating, one because of the actor's negligence, the other not because of any
misconduct on his part, and each of itself is sufficient to bring about harm to
another, the actor's negligence may be found to be a substantial factor in
bringing it about.").
145. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 27 cmt. d ("This Section applies in a case of multiple sufficient causes,
regardless of whether the competing cause involves tortious conduct or consists
only of innocent conduct."); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR
PHYSICAL HARM § 26 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft 2005)
(explaining that the "causal-set model [adopted by the Restatement (Third)] is
also consistent with the necessary element of a sufficient set (NESS) test that
Professor Wright has refined and popularized in recent legal academic
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the harm.
The difference is that a court that follows the
Restatement (Second) of Torts will hold the tortious actor liable for
the entire harm.1 46 Under the Restatement (Third), on the other
hand, the tortious actor may not pay any damages.1 47
Interestingly, the reporters of Restatement (Third) were not
always so certain about the state of the law. In the first draft, they
adopted the same position as the Restatement (Second). 148 By 2007,
they took the current view, explaining that "[r]equiring the
tortfeasor to pay damages for harm that would have occurred in any
event due to non-tortious forces is less persuasive than when both
causes are tortious."14 9 Adopted in 2010, the final version of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional
Harm omits the explanatory note, but it does express the reporters'
final view that the victim may not receive any damages.150 This is
the final version, despite an admission "that virtually every one of
the handful of cases to confront the situation adhered to
[Restatement (Second)

§ 432(2)] comment d position."51

literature on causation") (citing Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73
CALIF. L. REV. 1735 (1985)).
146. This is the result of the causation rule set in Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 432 cmt. d, illus. 3 & 4 (causation) and the apportionment rule set in
Restatement (Second) § 433A(2), which in cmt. i explains that "[c]ertain kinds of
harm, by their very nature, are normally incapable of any logical, reasonable, or
practical division." A "destruction by fire" is provided as an example.
Where two or more causes combine to produce such a single result,
incapable of division on any logical or reasonable basis, and each is a
substantial factor in bringing about the harm, the courts have refused
to make an arbitrary apportionment for its own sake, and each of the
causes is charged with responsibility for the entire harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A(2) cmt. i.
147.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL

HARM § 27 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (acknowledging that "[tihe Restatement
Second of Torts § 432(2), cmt. d, provides that when innocent and tortious
multiple sufficient causes concur, the actor responsible for the tortious cause is
a legal cause of the harm and subject to liability for all of the harm" but
admitting that "[u]nlike the Second Restatement, this Section does not address
the matter of the amount of liability of such an actor-it only provides that such
tortious conduct is a factual cause of the harm").
148. David W. Robertson, Causation in the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Three Arguable Mistakes, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1007, 1025 (2009) (citing the
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM

§

27 cmt. d (AM. LAW

INST., Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005)).
149. Id. at 1025-26 (2009) (citing the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB.
FOR PI-YSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM

§

27 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST., Council Draft

No. 7, 2007)).
150.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL

HARM § 27 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
151. Michael D. Green, The Intersection of Factual Causationand Damages,
55 DEPAUL L. REV. 671, 685-86 (2006) (Green is one of the reporters of the
Restatement (Third)).
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a. The Prior Literature. The admittedly proactive approach of
the Restatement (Third) has been supported by a number of leading
economists. Rizzo and Arnold, for example, take the view that the
tortious actor should not pay any damages because the present
value of the house is equal to zero due to the fire caused by the
lightning. 152 They explain that even if the fire set by lightning has
not reached the house (but assuming it is destined to), no one would
be willing to pay for it because its fate is doomed. 153 On the other
hand, when two tortious actors set the fires, the present value of the
house should not be discounted and accordingly, the parties should
be jointly and severally liable for the entire harm. Rizzo and
Arnold's argument is lacking.1 54 The authors do not explain the
basis for distinguishing between the two cases. After all, in the case
of two tortious actors, each can argue-with equal force-that she
did not cause any damage because the value of the victim's house
was zero due to the other fire.
Shavell takes a more extreme approach. He argues that in all
overdetermined cases, the tortious actors should be exempted from
liability because neither is a cause-in-fact.1 5 5 The "only apparent
reason for imposing liability" in the case of two tortious actors, he
argues, is to avoid "collusive behavior." 156 Absent liability, an actor
who tortiously set a fire that is about to destroy the victim's house
would "then convince another neighbor to set a second fire that
would merge [with her fire] so that [both] escape liability." 157
Shavell's analysis focuses on an ex-post scenario. He argues
that once one fire is raging, the actor who tortiously set the fire may
try to collude with another. 15 8 But if this is the "only" reason to
impose liability on the parties-as Shavell argues-then a "noliability" rule would be superior. 159 The reason is that if we assume
together with Shavell that the harm to the victim's property is

152. Mario J. Rizzo & Frank S. Arnold, Causal Apportionment in the Law of
Torts: An Economic Theory, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1414 (1980) ("Suppose that
a field is burned by two combining fires, one set wrongfully by A, the other of
unknown origin. If the origin of the second fire is innocent, A will pay no
damages, because the present value of the property destroyed takes into
account the impact of that fire. On the other hand, if the second fire is also of
wrongful origin, its occurrence does not reduce compensable value. Thus, the
objective marginal value product of each cause is the same as it would have
been absent the other cause: the full value of the property destroyed.").

153. Id.
154. For a critical view of the authors' proposal on other grounds, see David
Kaye & Mikel Aickin, A Comment on Causal Apportionment, 13 J. LEGAL STUD.
191, 208 (1984).
155. Steven Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in
Torts, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 463, 495 (1980).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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unavoidable, a liability rule would not save the .property (it is
doomed). It will only result in a distributive effect that would
require costly adjudication with no economic benefits. Moreover, as
explained below, an ex-ante analysis reveals that Shavell's
concern-a collusion between actors-is not solved by holding actors
liable. To the contrary, imposing liability on actors may encourage
them to collude, but this could be socially desirable. The result is
that to increase welfare, a tortious actor should always be liable,
whether her fire combined with a non-tortious or tortious force.
b. Imposing Liability Is Justified. A more nuanced analysis
requires a distinction between ex-ante and ex-post considerations.
The analysis reveals that the view reflected by the Restatement
(Second)-holding a tortious actor liable for the entire harm 160-is

justified.
i. Non-Tortious and Tortious Forces. Consider first the
case where a non-tortious fire merges with a fire set tortiously.
Begin with the ex-post analysis. Here, the efficient result would
occur whether the tortious actor is subject to liability or not. To see
why, assume a fire set by a non-tortious source (e.g., lightning) is
already raging or will surely rage. In such a case, exempting the
actor who tortiously set the second fire from liability makes sense.
The second tortious fire will not impose any additional cost (the
house is already doomed), but it may generate some benefits.
An ex-ante analysis shows that if the non-tortious fire is indeed
unpredictable and improbable (e.g., lightning), the socially desirable
result will likely occur whether liability is imposed or not. In such
cases, the actor will always expect to bear the victim's harm alone.
The fact that she may be exempted from liability under the
Restatement (Third) is of no consequence. Unable to rely on the
happenstance that her fire will merge with another, the actor can
only expect to be the sole cause of the harm, and thus the only one
liable. She will thus take care or avoid the activity so long as the
expected judgment outweighs her expected benefits. If, at the end of
the day, the tortious actor is subject to liability, the victim will also
be compensated, if harmed.
The conclusion is that, administrative considerations aside,
both no-liability and full-liability would be equally efficient. Still, a
liability regime seems to be more consistent with the goals set forth
in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and
Emotional Harm. If holding two tortious actors liable (and thereby
incentivizing them to act tortiously towards the victim) "comports
with deep-seated intuitions about causation and fairness," it is hard
to see why holding only the tortious actor liable won't.1 6 1 Exempting
160.
161.
HARM

See supranote 144 and accompanying text.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
§ 27 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
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the tortious actor from liability is tantamount to giving her a
windfall at the expense of a remediless victim.
The analysis above assumed that the non-tortious fire is wholly
unpredictable and improbable. However, in some (likely rare) cases,
the possibility of harm by a non-tortious actor may be incorporated
into the tortious actor's ex-ante considerations. If so, a rule that
exempts the tortious actor from liability may be inefficient.
Consider, for example, the following hypothetical.
Example 3B: Merging Fires. A steel factory is located in
a ravine that leads to Ps $100 cabin. The factory expects a
$50 benefit from its operation. The production process is
such that there is a 40% chance that it would result in a
fire, but this can be avoided if the factory installs a $20
device. Given the topography and other factors, it is known
that any fire will destroy Ps cabin, and that if the fires
originate from the factory and natural conditions (e.g.,
lightning), the chance of which is 10%, they would merge.
First, note that if the factory does not take care, it will increase
the risk of harm by only 30% (40-10). In the other 10% of cases, the
harm would occur anyway due to the natural conditions. Thus, from
a social perspective, taking care is cost-justified only if the cost of
precaution is cheaper than the incremental increase in expected
harm-that is, if it is cheaper than $30 (30%x100).
If the law exempts from liability the tortious party whose fire
merges with the natural fire, the actor will not take care. On the
other hand, a rule that imposes liability for the entire harm would
incentivize her to take care (20<40%x100). But if the cost of care is
$35, a liability rule would be inefficient. It would incentivize the
factory to take care (35<40) when care should not be taken (35>30).
Liability above $30 may be "excessive." The ideal liability rule
would thus be one that imposes on an actor liability that is equal to
the marginal increase in the expected liability due to her tortious
activity. Administering such a rule will likely be too costly, if not
impossible (could courts really determine the incremental increase
in expected liability due to the tortious behavior?).
Here, the
economist lawyer must make an empirical assumption. Which
situation would be costlier to society: a no-liability rule resulting in
under-investment in precaution, or a liability rule resulting in overinvestment in precaution? If one believes that over-deterrence is
preferable-and one can easily provide moral and theoretical
arguments in support of that assumption-then holding the tortious
actor liable is preferable. This is the view of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts.162

162.

See supra notes 144-45, 147-48 and accompanying text.
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ii. Tortious Forces. For completeness, consider now the
case of two tortious actors whose fires may merge. The ex-post
analysis in this case is identical to the one discussed in the previous
section. 163 Given one fire, setting another may provide benefits at
no cost. For example, if one enjoys seeing a house burned down by a
large fire, setting the second tortious fire could even be perceived as
socially desirable.
Ex-ante, if the parties are unaware of each other, the analysis is
also identical to that of the lightning hypothetical. 16 4 Suppose that
each actor expects a $30 benefit and the expected harm to the victim
is $40. Neither would engage in the risky activity because, unaware
of the other, each would expect a $40 judgment and thus a $10 loss
(30-40). It is true that, at the end of the day, each may pay less
(e.g., $20), but this is a windfall that does not enter the actors' exante considerations.
On the other hand, if the parties are aware of each other and
can credibly pre-commit, the parties will have an incentive to enter
into a tort-tract (for example, by way of an agreement). The torttract would allow each to expect a diluted liability of $20 (40/2) and
accordingly, a $10 profit (30-20). Thus, while Shavell's concern was
that, absent liability, parties would collude to avoid liability, this
Article shows that, if subject to liability, the parties would have an
incentive to collude, but this could produce a desirable result.
Moreover, if the actors are not subject to liability, they would be
better off engaging in risky activities even when it is socially
undesirable to do so; for example, when each benefits $15
(15x2<40). 165
The conclusion is that liability aligns the actors' incentives with
that of society. The reason, however, is not based on "intuition" or a
nebulous discounting theory. 166 The reason is that in the case of
multiple actors, the imposition of liability and its dilution
incentivizes the actors to act tortiously and perhaps even efficiently
(assuming enough actors join the activity). By contrast, exempting
the parties from liability could result in welfare-decreasing
accidents.
B.

Signaling by Way of Enabling the Tortious Act

Another way to independently signal one's commitment to
engage in tortious activity is to enable it. An example is Moses v.
Town of Morganton.167 In Moses, two actors polluted a creek located

163.

See supra Subpart II.A.4.b.i.

164. See id.
165. See Shavell, supra note 155 (appearing to argue that even when "two
individuals are known always to set their fires independently" the parties
should not be liable).
166. See supra text accompanying notes 152, 161.
167. 133 S.E. 421 (N.C. 1926).
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above the plaintiffs land. 168 A municipality emptied human waste
from its sewages, and an animal processing operation discharged
animal remains. 169 A third actor, a power company, built a dam
that backed up the polluted water onto the plaintiffs land. 170
Importantly, although each of the parties was aware of the others'
operations,
each acted independently. 171
There was no
17 2
agreement.
Still, the court held all liable:
If parties, although acting independently, know, or have
reasonable grounds to believe, that their independent acts,
combining with the independent acts of others, will create a
result that will become a nuisance, and they do so causing
damage, they become as it were joint wrongdoers ab initio, and
are liable as joint tortfeasors. 173
In cases like Moses, even absent an agreement, each actor may
be able to rely on the others' behavior and thus independently decide
to engage in the activity. This is especially true when the activities
and the injury are not instantaneous so that each actor can engage
in tortious activity (e.g., pollution or building a dam) while observing
the others doing the same. Moses is also interesting in that it took
three actors to cause the harm. 174 Thus, each party could rely on the
fact that its tortious activity would not give rise to liability unless
enough tortfeasors joined the party and thus diluted its liability. In
other words, each actor may have had a dominant strategy to act
tortiously.
C.

The Substitution Hypothesis
1.

Refining the Hypothesis and Offering Predictions

Part II shows that, in some cases, an agreement is necessary to
allow the parties to pre-commit to engage in or sponsor a wrongful
activity. In other cases, credibly signaling the commitment, would
suffice. Armed with this insight, it is now possible to refine the

168.

169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 422.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

173. Id. at 423 (emphasis added); see also Warren v. Parkhurst, 92 N.Y.S.
725, 727 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1904), aff'd, 93 N.Y.S. 1009 (N.Y. App. Div. 1905), aff'd,
78 N.E. 579 (N.Y. 1906) ("[W]hile each defendant acts separately, he is acting at
the same time in the same manner as the other defendants, knowing that the
contributions by himself and the others acting in the same way will result
necessarily in the destruction of the plaintiffs property. If necessary, in order
to get at them, a court ... may infer a unity of action, design, and
understanding, and that each defendant is deliberately acting with the others
in causing the destruction of the plaintiffs property.").
174. Moses, 133 S.E. at 422.
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Substitution Hypothesis discussed in Causation Actually.1 75 Under
the hypothesis, certain group causation theories-including
concerted action, substantial factor, and alternative liability-can be
interchangeable. 176 This Article shows that they can all serve as a
commitment device that dilutes the expected liability of the
injurers-those who physically harmed the victim. And, by doing so,
these theories can encourage the parties to act tortiously in the first
place.
It is thus not surprising that courts use these causation theories
interchangeably. For instance, in Example 2, the two drivers can be
held liable under a concerted action or substantial factor theory if
each contributed to the harm. 177 Similarly, the court may apply
concerted action or alternative liability if it is not clear which driver
Two famous hunting cases, Oliver v.
was the injuring party.
Miles 178 and Summers v. Tice, 179 illustrate the interchangeability.
In both cases two parties in a hunting group shot carelessly and one
of them, although it was not clear whom, injured the victim's eye.18 0
The Oliver court used concerted action theory to hold liable both
hunters. 181 The Summers court reached the same result by applying
alternative liability. 182 And, in McMillan v. Mahoney,183 a case with
a similar fact pattern, the court explicitly held that the plaintiff
could recover under a theory of concerted action, alternative
liability, or both. 184
Still, the three doctrines are not identical and, in some cases,
they will not be interchangeable. It is now possible to provide a
more detailed prediction as to when the three doctrines can be used.
In cases where all parties contributed to the harm, tort law can use
a concurrent causes theory like substantial factor to impose liability
on all. There is no need to look for an agreement to hold them
liable. By contributing to the victim's harm, each party indicates
that it is in her best interest to act carelessly, and accordingly, that
the accident is, at least at first approximation, socially desirable.

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Dillbary, supranote 122, at 40.
Id. at 40, 43.
See supraPart II.
110 So. 666 (Miss. 1926).
199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
Id.; Oliver, 110 So. at 667.
Oliver, 110 So. at 668 ("We think that they were jointly engaged in the

unlawful enterprise of shooting at birds flying over the highway; that they were
in pursuit of a common purpose; that each did an unlawful act, in the pursuit

thereof; and that each is liable for the resulting injury to the boy, although no
one can say definitely who actually shot him.").

182. See Summers, 199 P.2d at 4.
183. 393 S.E.2d 298 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990).
184. Id. at 300 (reviewing such decisions and concluding that "[n]umerous
cases from [different] jurisdictions allow a plaintiff to recover either under
[alternative liability] theory, under a theory of 'acting in concert,' or under some
combination of the two").
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For if the benefit of each party outweighs the diluted cost, it must be
that the total benefits outweigh the cost to the victim. 185 By
contributing to the harm, the actor also commits to shoulder
liability.
An agreement is thus unnecessary.
In these cases,
concerted action and substantial factor theories are truly
interchangeable. 186
In other cases, some of the parties clearly did not injure the
victim, but their commitment to liability-sharing in case of an
accident was still strong. It is their tortious, if non-injurious,
actions which signal the commitment necessary for dilution to occur.
Cases like Summers and Oliver belong in this category. In both, by
joining the activity (hunting), each hunter credibly signaled his
commitment to cost-sharing.
Regardless of whether the court
applies alternative liability (as did the court in Summers),187 or
concerted action (as did the court in Oliver), 188 each hunter knows
that both will be liable and accordingly, that the cost of any injury
will be split between them.
Finally, in some cases, there is simply nothing-short of an
agreement-that would assure the parties that non-injuring parties
who were the actual cause of the accident would also be liable for its
consequences. A drag race in which dilution requires that the
spectator be held liable belongs in such a category. Substantial
factor and alternative liability cannot assure the injurer that a party
who cannot even potentially injure the victim (e.g., a spectator) will
shoulder her liability in case of an accident.
Concerted action,
however, can.
2.

Substitutes as Second-Best Options

An actual agreement enforced by tort law-a tort-tract-has
many benefits. A major benefit is that each party can be sure, with
a high degree of certainty, that her liability will be sufficiently
diluted to justify her tortious activity. Moreover, an agreement
provides a better dilution mechanism because it allows those who
cannot even potentially contribute to the harm to share its cost and
thus induce others. This is illustrated in Example 2A, where a race
between two drivers promised each a gain of $60, but an expected
cost of $150 to the victim. In such a case, neither driver would want
to race because each driver could only expect a loss (60-150/2<0).
But if a bystander or passenger pre-commits (by way of an
185. By denoting Bi, as the benefit to actor i, and D the expected damage to
the victim, it must be that if Bi>D/n then the aggregate benefits of the n actors,
ZBi, outweigh the expected cost, D (i.e., ZBi>D), which means that the accident
is, at least initially, cost-justified.
186. Concerted action is still preferable as it allows the actors to define the
pool of defendants with much certainty, thereby facilitating the tort-tract. See
text accompanying note 233.
187. See Summers, 199 P.2d at 3; supra note 180 and accompanying text.
188. See Oliver, 110 So. at 668; supra note 181 and accompanying text.
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agreement) to share the cost of an injury, each driver would race
carelessly for an expected benefit of $10 (60-150/3).
An agreement to act tortiously would benefit the parties and,
under certain circumstances, may even be socially desirable. But as
this Part shows, in some cases an agreement is not an option. This
can happen if the cost of transacting is too high. In other cases, it is
the inability of the law to enforce an agreement to share the benefits
of a tortious enterprise that would force the parties to tort-tract by
way of contributing to the harm.
The following example is
illustrative:
Example 3C: Polluting Factories. Two factories, F1 and
F2, are located next to Ps $50 property. If one factory acts
carelessly, the pollution and waste it releases will not
suffice to cause any harm to the victim's property.
However, if both factories operate carelessly, the property
will surely be destroyed. Each factory benefits $35 and the
cost of care for each is $30.
From a social perspective, it is better that one factory takes care
and the other does not. In such a case Ps property will not be
destroyed (it takes two to harm), the careless factory will profit $35,
the one that operates with care will enjoy a $5 (35-30) profit, and
society's welfare will increase by $40 and reach its peak.1 89
The factories' actions, however, depend upon the effect of tort
law on their private payoffs. First, consider what would happen if
the factories were not subject to any group causation liability (like
substantial factor or concerted action). In such a case, each factory
would have a dominant strategy to act without taking care. Taking
care promises each an expected gain of $5 (35-30), but acting
carelessly with impunity promises an expected gain of $35,
regardless of the other party's actions. Accordingly, both factories
would operate carelessly, each would expect a gain of $35, the victim
would be harmed and uncompensated, and total welfare would
increase by only $20 (35x2-50).
If the law held (as it does)190 all careless parties liable (for
example, by applying the substantial factor doctrine), the same
result would occur: both factories would operate carelesslyl 9 1 and

189. Total welfare will be $10 (35x2-30x2) if both take care, $20 (35x2-50) if
none takes care, and $40 if only one factory operated without care (35+35-30).
190. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., Inc., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.
1947) (holding that one should take care so long as B<PL, where B is the cost of
precautions and PL are the expected benefits therefrom). Under the Hand
formula, a factory that does not take care will be considered in breach of its
duties because the $30 cost of precaution is outweighed by the $50 expected
harm. See also supra note 122 (explaining that courts engage in individual,
rather than aggregate, cost-benefit analysis).
191. Because the harm to the victim does not materialize unless both
factories act carelessly, the only difference in the parties' payoff is in the case
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total welfare would not change (35x2-50).1 92 To see why, consider
Fl's payoff. If Fl takes care it can expect to gain $5 (35-30). On the
other hand, if Fl and F2 both act carelessly, Fl can expect to gain
$10 (35-50/2). And, if Fl acts carelessly while F2 acts with care, Flo
can expect $35. The result is a dominant strategy to act carelessly
(10>5, 35>5). No matter what the other factory does, each factory is
better off forgoing care, even if as a result it will be held liable. The
parties' payoffs are summarized in Table 2 below.
TABLE 2: THE FACTORIES PAYOFFS WHEN LIABILITY ATTACHES
F2

F1

Operate

Operate

Carefully

Carelessly

Operate
Carefully

F1 F2
5 5

F1 F2
5 35

Operate
Carelessly

F1 F2
35 5

F1 F2
10 10

To summarize, the parties would behave carelessly under a noliability regime as well as under a regime that holds them liable. 193
On the other hand, if the parties could negotiate and enter into a
binding contract, they would agree on the socially desirable result.
They would devise a contract that is comprised of two parts. The
first is that one of the factories operates carelessly and the other
carefully. The result would be a combined net profit of $40 (35+5).
The second part would devise a benefit-sharing mechanism. For
example, the parties may agree to share the expected gain equally.
In such a case, each can expect $20 (40/2), twice the expected gain,
which they can enjoy if they act independently.
If the parties cannot negotiate or if courts find such agreements
to be against public policy, in violation of antitrust laws or otherwise
unenforceable, the parties would need to resort to second best
options. To see why, suppose that the two factories agreed that Fl
acts with care (and makes $5), F2 acts carelessly (and makes $35),
and that the parties will share the profits equally. If the parties
operate as agreed, but then F2 refuses to keep its promise under the
second part of the agreement-that is, if it refuses to share its $35
where they both act carelessly. In such a case, each expects a diluted liability of
$25 (50/2) and thus an expected gain of $10 (35-25) which is still better than
the alternatives (no operation or taking care).
192. A major difference between the two situations is distributional: when
the parties are held liable, the victim will be compensated. See also infra note
193.

193.

Holding the parties liable is still preferable because the threat of

liability would encourage them to forgo socially undesirable activities.

Subpart II.A.

Supra
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profit-F1 will be remediless. Contract law will not provide Fl with
a remedy because, by assumption, the contract is unenforceable.
Concerted action theory will also fail to bring the private and
socially desirable result. The problem is that a group causation
It dilutes the cost of
theory is a cost-sharing mechanism.
operation-the expected liability in case of an accident. Concerted
action is especially effective in diluting the injurers' expected
liability because it imposes liability even on those who did not
actively participate in the wrongdoing. But even concerted action
has its limits. Here, if the parties fulfilled the first part of the
agreement (operation), there is no harm to be diluted. Because it
takes two to harm, if F1 operates with care and F2 acts carelessly,
the victim is not harmed at all. Moreover, concerted action does not
provide a benefit-sharing mechanism. Unlike the drag race example
where the benefits were conferred upon the parties immediately, Fl
will not be able to enforce the benefit-sharing provision of the
agreement and will thus enjoy an expected profit of $5 rather than
$20.194 Knowing this, F1 will not enter into the agreement to begin
Between an unenforceable agreement that promises an
with.
expected gain of $5 or acting independently for an expected gain of
$10, the latter option is preferable. The result is that an accident,
which should and could be avoided if the parties took care, will
occur.
The point is that in some cases the parties must enter into
agreement to avoid an outcome that would be bad for both them and
society. In the above example, the welfare enhancing result will
occur if the law enforces a benefit-sharing contract that will allow
the parties to avoid the predicaments of a prisoner's dilemma. The
Tort law enforces agreements to act
result is a legal irony.
carelessly that result in injuries. But in some cases, it cannot be
used to enforce agreements that would avoid the accident to the
benefit of all. Moreover, in many cases, the parties may not be able
to negotiate or enter into an agreement to begin with. In some of
these cases, the substantial factor doctrine can serve as an effective,
but costly, substitute. It will allow the parties to operate, but at
some cost to third parties.
In other cases, the inability to share benefits may result in the
curtailment of important and desirable products and services. This
is illustrated in Example 3D below.
Example 3D: Polluting Factories with Heterogeneous
Valuations. Two neighboring factories, F1 and F2, stand
to benefit from their operation $40 and $20 respectively. A
factory that operates would alone destroy Ps $50 property.
Taking care is impossible (or too costly).

194.

See supra Examples 2, 2A, 2B.
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Suppose that both factories produce products or services that
society deems valuable (e.g., the production of electricity and
cement). Here, production comes at a cost to a third party, but it is
welfare enhancing. It generates a total benefit of $60 (40+20) at a
cost of $50.
However, without an agreement that allows the
factories to share their benefits, the products will not be produced.
F2 will not operate because it can only expect a loss (at a minimum
20-50/2<0) and F1 would not operate alone (40<50). An agreement
to share profits will allow F1 to convince F2 to produce (and thus
share) the $50 expected liability. For example, an agreement to
transfer of $7 from Fl would allow both to expect a profit. The
agreement, however, is destined to fail. Contract law would treat it
as unenforceable. And, for the reasons explained earlier, tort law
would also be unable to provide a remedy. 195 The result is that
unless other parties can join the tortfest, society would have to forgo
a desirable product.
3.

Concerted Action and the Agreement Requirement

The tort-tractual analysis allows us to redefine the nebulous
concerted action theory.
Prosser and Keeton, the Restatement
(Second), and many courts have insisted that an agreement between
the tortfeasors is a prerequisite for applying concerted action. 196
The agreement can be explicit or tacit. 197 But "mere knowledge by
198
each party of what the other is doing" is not enough.

195. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 21 and accompanying text;
accompanying text.

infra note

197 and

197. See Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 353, 371
(E.D.N.Y. 1972) (noting that '[c]ooperation' or 'concert' has been found in
various

business

and

property

relationships,

group

activities

such

as

automobile racing, cooperative efforts in medical care or railroad work, and
concurrent water pollution" and holding that "[e]xpress agreement is not
necessary; all that is required is that there shall be a common design or

understanding" (quoting William Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25
CALIF. L. REV. 413, 429-30 (1937)); see also Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d
924, 932 (Cal. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980) (citing PROSSER AND
KEETON with approval); Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 527 N.E.2d 333, 350 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 560 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. 1990) ("The parties need
not expressly agree to commit the tortious acts, but they cannot be held liable
unless there is a tacit understanding between them."); KEETON ET AL., supra
note 8 ("Express agreement is not necessary, and all that is required is that

there be a tacit understanding . . . .").
198. KEETON ET AL., supra note 8. Surprisingly, this seems to be also the
view of the Restatement (Second). Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §

876 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1979) ("Parties are acting in concert when they act in
accordance with an agreement to cooperate in a particular line of conduct or to
accomplish a particular result."), with cmt. d (the presence or absence of actor is

relevant to determine whether there was "encouragement"), and illus. 6.
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Courts that have argued otherwise have been chastised as being
"clearly wrong." 199 Prosser and Keeton point to Moses v. Town of
Morganton,200 as an example of providing such a "wrong" statement
of the law. 2 0 1 Recall that in Moses, two actors polluted a body of
water which was then "dammed up and backed up" by a third party,
resulting in harmful deposits on the plaintiffs land. 20 2 The court
found that each actor acted "independently" and that it was the
parties' combined acts which harmed the plaintiff. 2 0 3 It then made
the following statement, which scholars like Prosser and Keeton
interpreted as applying concerted action theory:
Where all have knowledge of the independent acts that create
the result and continue the independent acts with knowledge,
this ipso facto creates a concert of action and makes a common
design or purpose.
Any other position .. . would make
plaintiffs practically remediless, although there is a nuisance
which all jointly concurred in and contributed to, that is
alleged made the plaintiffs' land valueless, and but-for such
joinder the injury would not have occurred. 204
In cases like Moses, it is true that "[w]here all have knowledge
of the independent acts that create the result and continue the
independent acts with knowledge [that they will share liability], this
ipso facto creates a concert of action and makes a common design or
purpose." 205

But Moses is not a concerted action case, and it is

unclear that the court alleged that it was as Prosser and Keeton
argue. 206 In fact, there is evidence in the decision to support the

199. KEETON ETAL., supra note 8.
200. See supra Subpart II.B.
201. KEETON ET AL., supra note 8; see also Fleming James Jr. & Roger F.

Perry, Legal Cause, 60 YALE L.J. 761, 781 (1951) (citing Moses and the excerpt
above in support of the preposition that "[t]he court may distort and expand the
concert of action notion, finding such concert, and entire liability, when under
accepted usage, none is present").
202. Moses v. Town of Morganton, 133 S.E. 421, 421 (N.C. 1926).
203. See id. at 423.
204. Id. (emphasis added); see also Warren v. Parkhurst, 92 N.Y.S. 725, 727
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1904), aff'd, 93 N.Y.S. 1009 (N.Y. App. Div. 1905), aff'd, 78 N.E.
579 (N.Y. 1906) ("[W]hile each defendant acts separately, he is acting at the
same time in the same manner as the other defendants, knowing that the
contributions by himself and the others acting in the same way will result
necessarily in the destruction of the plaintiffs property. If necessary, in order
to get at them, a court . . may infer a unity of action, design, and
understanding, and that each defendant is deliberately acting with the others
in causing the destruction of the plaintiffs property.").
205. Moses, 133 S.E. at 423 (emphasis added). Moses is not a rare exception,
a fact to which even Prosser and Keeton alluded. See KEETON ET AL., supra note
8 (referring to such statements as "occasional").

206.

See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
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claim that the Moses court only drew an analogy to concerted action,
and that it viewed the case as one involving concurrent forces. 207
To understand why Moses drew on concerted action theory, a
quick detour to the history of the laws of joinder and apportionment
is required. 208 In the past, the term "joint tortfeasors" only applied
to those who acted in concert. 209 In contrast, "[t]ortfeasors who
concurrently, but unintentionally caused an indivisible harm were
not considered joint tortfeasors." 2 10 As such, they could not be joined
to one proceeding and their liability had to be several, even if there
was no rational basis for dividing the indivisible harm they
caused. 2 11 It is against this background that Moses should be
interpreted. The defendants in Moses tried to avoid liability by
arguing that because they did not act in concert, they were not "joint
tortfeasors," and thus each should be sued separately and neither
should be liable for the acts of another. 2 12 The Moses court rejected
this argument. 2 13 It explained that concerted action cases belong to
only one category of cases where joint and several liability would
apply. 2 1 4 Other situations where joint and several liability apply
include concurrent causes cases. 2 1 5 "[W]here the negligence of two
or more persons concur in producing a single, indivisible injury, then
such persons are jointly and severally liable, although there was
no . . . concert of action."2 16
Not surprisingly, the holding in other concurring causes cases is
identical. In Tidal Oil Co. v. Pease,2 17 for example, the court held
that "where, although concert is lacking, the separate and
independent acts or negligence of several combine to produce

207.

See supra note 204 and accompanying text; infra note 215 and

accompanying text.

208.

Dillbary, supra note 9, at 1743-51 (explaining the history of the laws of

joinder and apportionment in detail).

209. See id. at 1738.
210. Id. at 1735.
211. See id. at 1735-36.
212. Moses v. Town of Morganton, 133 S.E. 421, 422 (N.C. 1926) (the
defendant argued that "it clearly appears, from the allegations of the complaint,
that the three defendants herein are not joint tortfeasors, but, if tortfeasors at
all, that they acted independently, without concert or collusion .. . to pollute the
waters" and accordingly that "the causes of action alleged in the complaint are
not joint but separate and severable").
213. Id. at 424.
214. Id. at 423 ("[I]n many cases ... to make parties joint tortfeasors, there
must be a common concert of action, design, or purpose.").

215.

Id. ("There is a class of cases in which ...

[the defendants'] acts are

concurrent .. . and unite in setting in operation a single destructive

and

dangerous force which produced the injury. There is also another class of cases
in which [the defendants'] . . . acts are separate and distinct as to place and
time, but culminate in producing a public nuisance which injures the person or
property of another.").

216.
217.

Id. (emphasis added).
5 P.2d 389 (Okla. 1931).
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directly a single injury, each is responsible for the entire result, even
though his act or neglect alone might not have caused it."218 In fact,
the holding in Tidal Oil is a quote from Northup v. EakeS 2 1 9 -a
concurring cause decision that is indistinguishable from Moses. 220
Finally, note that the facts of Moses are similar to those in
Example 2A (two drivers and a spectator) and cases like Cooper v.
Bondoni221 where passengers served the driver drinks and enticed a
reckless ride. 2 2 2 They are similar in that in all of these cases, some
actors committed to share liability early in time. In Moses, it was
the polluting factories; 223 in Example 2A, it was the encouraging
spectator; 224 and in Cooper, it was the passengers who served the
driver with alcohol and urged him to bypass a truck in a no passing
zone. 225

And, in all of these cases, the harm would not have

happened unless all parties behaved tortiously. Indeed, but-for the
bystander and passenger encouragement and the dam builder's
careless construction, the harm would not have occurred.
The fact that Prosser and Keeton (mis)characterized Moses as a
concerted action case is thus not just understandable; it also
evidences-and is a testimony of the power of-the Substitution
218. Id. at 391 (quoting Walters v. Prairie Oil & Gas Co., 204 P. 906, 908
(Okla. 1922)). Walters cited the quoted excerpt from Northup v. Eakes, 178 P.
266, 268 (Okla. 1918) on which Restatement (Second) Torts § 433A (1965) illus.
14 is based (two actors who carelessly discharged oil into a stream that was
ignited by an unknown source resulting in a destruction of the victim's property
are both jointly and severally liable). Walters, 204 P. at 908.
219. 178 P. 266 (Okla. 1918).
220. See id. at 268. Like Moses, Northup involved two careless polluters of
streams that discharged waste. See id. at 267. And like Moses, a third party
contributed to the harm. Id. at 268. The only difference is that in Moses, it was
the builder of a dam who forced the debris to overflow into the victim's property
whereas in Northup, it was an unknown source that ignited the oil that was
discharged by the defendants resulting in a fire the destroyed the victim's barn.
See id.; see also Warren v. Parkhurst, 92 N.Y.S. 725 (Sup. Ct. 1904), aff'd, 93
N.Y.S. 1009 (App. Div. 1905), aff'd, 186 N.Y. 45 (N.Y. 1906). Warren involved
twenty-six mills that, for a period of six years, discharged foul materials into a
creek. Id. at 725. The contribution of each mill was harmless, but together the
combined waste rendered the plaintiffs property useless. Id. at 725-26.
Importantly, the mills that were located next to each other acted separately and
without a contract. See id. at 727. Still, the court held all jointly and severally
liable based on a concerted action theory. Id. at 728. It explained that "each
[mill was] acting at the same time in the same manner as the other defendants,
knowing that the contributions by himself and the others acting in the same
way will result necessarily in the destruction of the plaintiffs property." Id. at
727. The irony is that the court acted as a court of equity. Id. at 728. It did
what it deemed "necessary, in order to get at [the defendants]." Id. at 727, 728.
In "getting at" these defendants the court of equity may have encouraged the
very behavior it condemned as a court of equity.
221. 841 P.2d 608 (Okla. Civ. App. 1992).
222. Id. at 612; supra Example 2A.
223. Moses v. Town of Morganton, 133 S.E. 421, 421 (N.C. 1926).
224. See supra Examples 2A, 2B.
225. Cooper, 841 P.2d at 609.
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Hypothesis. 226 Causation theories like concerted action, substantial
factor and alternative liability, are all commitment mechanisms
enforced by tort law. It is this similarity between the functions of
the different theories that confused the authors. Understanding the
substitution hypothesis allows us to clarify the confusion. In cases
like Moses, the distinction may be meaningless. But it can matter,
for example, if a fourth party contributed to the harm. It could not
escape liability under concerted action theory (and it should not),
but it could be exempted under the substantial factor theory, if for
example, its contribution was trivial and was nothing more than a
sampling attempt.
The point here is that tort-tracting is a way for the parties to
pre-commit to engage in wrongdoing. And, this can be done if the
parties (1) actually agree to commit a tort, (2) act carelessly but
independently with the knowledge that others do the same (as did
the parties in Moses), or (3) can otherwise credibly commit to share
the victim's damages.
III. OBJECTIONS
The Article argues that, currently, tort law steps into the realm
of contracts. It does so by offering tort-tracts, facilitating their
formation and enforcing their terms-terms that contract law
refuses to enforce because of their very tortious nature. By doing so,
tort law encourages the commission of tortious activities. It is
important to note that the Article does not argue that tort law is a
perfect (it is not) or even the best substitute for contract law. 227
Rather, its main goal is to highlight a phenomenon, start a vibrant
discussion, and invite others to weigh in.
Below are possible
concerns and objections to the effects and effectiveness of tort-tracts.
A.

The Assumptions and Examples

The model relies on stylized examples and a number of
assumptions. 228
Begin with the empirical (and thus testable)
assumption that actors (enterprises as well as individuals) can and
do engage in cost-benefit calculations (calculations that are
mandated by the Hand formula). 229 Start with the benefit side of
the equation. There is no reason to think that spectators and
drivers can determine how much they are willing to pay or accept to
participate in a legal race, but they cannot do the same when it
comes to an illegal drag race. And there could be little doubt that
enterprises (e.g., the farmers in Example 3A, the steel factory in
226. See Dillbary, supra note 122, at 40-43; supra Subpart II.C.
227. The tort machinery comes with high cost, including error and litigation
costs, which for simplicity, the Article ignores.
228. Dillbary, supra note 122, at 57-63 (discussing in detail some of the
assumptions and limitations of the model).
229. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
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Example 3B, and the polluting factories in Examples 3C and 3D)230
can estimate their expected benefits. Moreover, the Article does not
assume that benefits and costs are certain.
They never are.
Instead, it speaks of expected values, which take under
consideration the magnitude and probability of possible events.
Turn to the cost side of the equation. Calculating the expected
cost of an activity is more complicated. Each actor must be able to
determine not only the expected harm, D, but also her expected
liability. To do that, each actor must also know that the number of
participating actors, n, is large enough to make the activity
worthwhile. Actors must also know the law in the limited sense
that all participants would be liable if the victim is harmed, and
accordingly, that the individual expected liability would be diluted
to D/n. Calculating the expected cost is possible even if information
on possible occurrences and their respective probabilities is partial
or not available. For example, in some cases actors can use the
maximum harm as a proxy for D. Examples 3C and 3D illustrate
this point. There, each factory assumed that it would surely (that is,
with a probability of 100%) destroy the plaintiffs property, whose
value may be easily estimated. The ambiguity about the risk may
also incentivize actors to take more extreme measures to reduce the
expected liability. Drivers can race at night, in a deserted area or a
poor neighborhood. This would allow them to reduce the chance of
physically injuring a third party, the chance of detection, and the
magnitude of the damage. 231
The assumption that each actor knows the number of
participating actors, n, is also reasonable. In concerted action cases,
the actors are parties to an agreement and as such, can observe and
determine if n is large enough.
Moreover, tort law mitigates
concerns regarding the size of n. It promises each racing driver that
the number of liable actors-that is, n-will remain the same even if
at some point during the race some of the spectators and drivers can

230. See supra Part II.
231. Because damages in tort are a function of the victim's income,
conducting the activity in a low income or poor neighborhood is likely to result
in lower expected damages. See also Dillbary, supra note 122, at 58 n.212 and
accompanying text; Ronen Avraham & Kim Yuracko, Torts and Discrimination
9 (Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series,
Paper No. E570, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2646901 (explaining that "not
only does tort law's remedial damage scheme perpetuate existing racial and
gender inequalities, but also it creates ex-ante incentives for potential
tortfeasors that encourage future targeting of disadvantaged groups"); Ronen
Avraham & Kim Yuracko, Valuing Black Lives: A Constitutional Challenge to
the Use of Race-Based Tables in Calculating Tort Damages 12 (Univ. of Tex.
Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 674,
2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2955165 (explaining that in the use of racebased tables to calculate damages Black victims receive lower damage awards
compared to Whites).
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no longer be seen.2 3 2 The same is true in cases where the parties
As Example 3A
enter into a tort-tract by way of signaling.
demonstrates, tort law-via its substantial factor doctrine-allows
actors to sample, without fear of liability, in order to determine if
enough actors-that is, if n is large enough-to make the activity
Moreover, by imposing liability only on those who
worthwhile.
the harm, the doctrine requires parties to carefully
to
contributed
(and conservatively) calibrate their estimation of n. The substantial
factor doctrine incentivizes each actor to engage in the tortious
activity only if she believes that enough actors would harm the
233
victim and "punishes" those who overestimated that number.
There are also reasons to think that actors know (or could easily
predict) that the law imposes liability on multiple actors and as a
result, dilutes the liability of each. To begin with, in many cases,
more than one actor may harm the victim and if so, all injurers can
expect to be liable. This is especially the case in concurrent causes
situations where the harm will not materialize unless a minimum
number of tortious actions combine. Second, many actors are likely
repeat players or could, at low cost, learn that certain activities
subject multiple parties to liability. Third, the fact that the group
causation theories (e.g., concerted action) have been uniformly
premised on fairness and morality grounds suggests that all
The expressive
participants should expect to share liability.
extent such a
to
the
action,
like
concerted
doctrines
of
function
function exists, should also have an informative feature. 234 The
irony is that if the goal was-as it seems to be-to express distaste,
vindicate the victim' rights and dissuade actors from engaging in the
23 5
activities, it likely achieved the opposite result.

232. This is the progeny decision like Saisa and Lemons. See Saisa v. Lilja,
76 F.2d 380, 380-81 (1st Cir. 1935); Lemons v. Kelly, 397 P.2d 784, 787 (Or.
1964); supra notes 38-44.
233. Denote n as the actual number of actors whose tortious behavior will
contribute to the victim's harm. Suppose now that actor i underestimates that
number to be n, such that n'<n. Assuming, for simplicity, that the other (n-1)
actors would act regardless of actor i, then if actor i chose to behave tortiously
she will be subject to a higher liability than she estimated (D/n'>D/n).
234. See Scott Hershovitz, Treating Wrongs as Wrongs: An Expressive
Argument for Tort Law, 10 J. TORT LAW (forthcoming), https://ssrn.com
/abstract=3054163 (arguing, on corrective justice grounds, that "tort is
[primarily] an expressive institution" that sends messages "in the plain for all
to see" and "announces in advance that people may not be [harmed]"). Id. at 45, 57. According to the author, this expressive function extends to intentional
as well as negligence-based torts. Id. at 29.
235. See Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 343 N.W.2d 164, 176 n.19 (Mich. 1984)
(explaining that concerted action "seems to have developed to deter hazardous
group behavior"); Lyons v. Premo Pharm. Labs, Inc., 406 A.2d 185, 190 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979) ("The purpose of this theory is ... to deter anti-social
behavior."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 15
reporters' note cmt. a (AM. LAw INST. 2000) ("[Cloncerted action ... express[es]
moral condemnation for the actions of all of the defendants, refusing to let the
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A major benefit of the model is that its assumptions are
testable. Future scholarship could, for example, examine the extent
to which subjects are able to engage in cost-benefit calculations and
their knowledge of the law. Finally, it is important to note that the
model does not assume that parties are omniscient. The opposite is
true. It assumes that each party knows her expected benefits but
not those of others, that parties hold heterogeneous valuations, that
courts are unable to determine (not even ex-post) the subjective
value actors assign to activities, that actors behave strategically
when possible, and that transaction costs are often high.
B.

Punitive Damages

Punitive damages can serve as an anti-dilution mechanism but
their effect may be limited. To begin with, in a few states, damages
are "punitive" only in name, but in substance they are merely
compensatory. 236 Some states, like Louisiana and Massachusetts,
prohibit the award of punitive damages unless a statute allows it,237
while others, like Alabama, cap the amount that may be awarded. 2 38
Moreover, although in many of the examples the tortious
activities were intentional in the sense that the parties weighed the
cost from, and benefits of, their actions and were interested in the
activity (as opposed to harming another), such an intention may not
suffice for punitive damages. Mein ex rel. Mein v. Cook, 239 a case
involving two racing cars and an injured passenger, is illustrative. 240
In Mein, the Court of Appeals of Arizona held that a "race on a

individuals escape from liability by claiming that their participation in the tort
was less than that of the other defendants or that they did not themselves cause
the plaintiffs injury.") (emphasis added); Hershovitz, supra note 234, at 59
(arguing that "tort is good ... in vindicat[ing] the social standing of the victims
who invoke it").
236. JOHN J. KIRCHER & CHRISTINE M. WISEMAN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAw
AND PRAC. § 4:4 (2d ed. 2017) ("As awarded in Michigan, exemplary damages are
proper only to compensate the plaintiff for humiliation, a sense of outrage or an
indignity.") (emphasis added) (citing Unibar Maint. Serv., Inc. v. Saigh, 769
N.W.2d 911, 923-24 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009)).
237. McCoy v. Ark. Nat. Gas Co., 143 So. 383, 385-86 (La. 1932) ("There is
no authority in the law of Louisiana for allowing punitive damages in any case,
unless it be for some particular wrong for which a statute expressly authorizes
the imposition of some such penalty."); Haddad v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 455
Mass. 914 N.E.2d 59, 75 (Mass. 2009); KIRCHER & WISEMAN, supra note 236, at
§§ 4:5 to :10 (listing other similar jurisdictions).
238. ALA. CODE § 6-11-21 (LexisNexis 2017) (with a few exceptions, "no
award of punitive damages shall exceed three times the compensatory damages
of the party claiming punitive damages or five hundred thousand dollars
($500,000) [or 1,500,000 if the plaintiff sustained a physical injury], whichever
is greater").
239. 193 P.3d 790 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008);
240. Id. at 792. An example to the contrary is Blocher v. McConnell, 17 Pa.
D. & C.4th 97, 101-02 (C.P. 1992) (holding that there is "no difficulty" to award
punitive damages when the defendants engaged in a drag race).
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public street after an evening of drinking" was not an intentional
tort. 2 4 1 Relying on the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the Court of
Appeals explained that a tort can be considered intentional "only if
[i] the actor desired to cause the consequences-and not merely the
act itself-or if [ii] he was certain or substantially certain that the
consequences

would

result

from the

act." 242

The

Court

then

concluded that drag racing, without more, does not meet the
required standard:
There is no evidence, however, that [the two drivers] agreed to
commit an intentional tort . .. [T]he parties may have agreed
on conduct but there is no evidence they agreed to cause an
accident or serious physical injuries. . . . Absent evidence that
[the drivers] had a desire to cause harm to Mein or knowingly
agreed to have a serious accident, they did not agree to commit
an intentional tort within the meaning of A.R.S. § 122506(D)(1).243
The court then addressed the substantial certainty test. It held
that the race conducted at 10:45 p.m. on a public street under the
influence of alcohol 24 4 "cannot support a finding that significant
harm was certain or substantially certain to occur." 245 It explained

that causing substantial risk of harm is not enough. 246 "To be
deemed an intentional act, there must be certainty or substantial
certainty that significant harm will result"24 7 -and that, according
248
to the court, the plaintiff could not show.

Even if the tort is considered intentional and as such could give
rise to punitive damages, it is not clear at all that it would. 249 In

most states, the statutory standards require the plaintiff to prove
not only that the conduct was outrageous and intentional, but the
plaintiff must do so with clear and convincing evidence. 250
241.
242.

Mein, 193 P.3d at 794.
Id.

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Id. at 794-95 (emphasis added).
Id. at 791-92.
Id. at 795.
Id.
Id.
248. Id. at 796 ("It is unquestionably dangerous to drink and drive, and it is
even more dangerous for two drivers to then drag race on a public street. Such
conduct is irresponsible and reprehensible. But even if one believes that injury
was likely or probable to occur, we do not perceive that this record supports an
inference that these drivers knew to a certainty or substantial certainty that a
serious injury was about to occur.").
249. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS scope

note at 8 (AM. LAw INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2015) ("[A] finding of an
intentional tort is not, by itself, necessary or sufficient for an award of punitive
damages.").

250. Id. For state statutes requiring proof by clear and convincing evidence,
see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-20(a) (LexisNexis 2017) ("Punitive damages may not
be awarded in any civil action .

. other than in a tort action where it is proven
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Moreover, punitive damages may be especially inappropriate and
unlikely where the parties are faultless or the activity is deemed
socially desirable. An example is a case where the actors produce a
product that society desires and even commissioned (e.g., the
production of electricity). In such cases, aware of the important
social value of the activity, courts refuse to award punitive damages
or issue injunctions. 251
Finally, even if punitive damages are imposed, they may not be
effective. To serve as an effective anti-dilution mechanism, punitive
damages must be set at a high enough level to disgorge the actors'
benefits. 252 Thus, in Examples 1 and 2, with ten liable actors, each
could expect to gain $50 (60-100/10)-the difference between the
expected private benefit of $60, and the diluted liability of the $100
damage. Punitive damages set at a magnitude of four times the
injury would still allow each to expect a gain of $10 [60(100+400)/10].
C.

The Criminal Justice System

Some of the activities discussed (e.g., drag racing) may result in
criminal, not just civil, proceedings. In such cases, criminal liability
may serve as an effective anti-dilution liability that may deter the
parties. Still, as an empirical matter, it is likely that in many cases
the actors will not be subject to criminal liability. 253 This could be
because of the heightened standard of proof required in criminal
proceedings, prosecutorial discretion, lack of adequate resources, or
because the tortious act is not subject to criminal liability.

by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant consciously or deliberately
engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice with regard to the
plaintiff."); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (West 2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701(c)
(2005); TEX. CIv. PRAc. & REM. § 41.003(a) (West 2017); see also Linthicum v.
Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 675, 681 (Ariz. 1986) ("[W]hile a plaintiff
may collect compensatory damages upon proof by a preponderance of the
evidence of his injuries due to the tort of another, we conclude that recovery of
punitive damages should be awardable only upon clear and convincing evidence
of the defendant's evil mind.").
251. See, e.g., Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 83 S.W.
658, 660 (Tenn. 1904) (holding two copper factories liable for polluting nearby
farms despite the finding that they "conduct[ed] their business in a lawful way,
without any purpose or desire to injure any of the complainants; that
they . . pursu[ed] the ... only method known to the business or to science by
means of which copper ore of the character mined by the defendants can be
reduced; that the defendants have made every effort to get rid of the smoke and
noxious vapors, one of the defendants having spent $200,000 in experiments to
this end, but without result"); see also Dillbary, supra note 12, at 972-73.
252. See Dillbary, supra note 12.
253. See Dillbary, supra note 122, at 21-30 (analyzing the effects of the
criminal and tort systems on actors' behaviors).
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The "Tort" vs. the "Tract"

One may attack the "tract" in tort-tract. The argument could be
that a tort-tract is not a contract because it does not the let parties
specify their obligations. Rather, tort law imposes the obligations on
them. The distinction is incomplete. It is true that a contract is
usually an agreement by the parties for the parties, whereas a torttract is an arrangement that is offered by tort law. However, in
both, manifestation of mutual assent is a key element. A tort-tract
is simply a default take-it-or-leave-it arrangement just like a
boilerplate contract. A major difference is that a tort-tract is offered
by tort law (hence the term "arrangement"). Still, just like any
boilerplate agreement, it becomes binding only if the parties agree to
adopt its terms. 254
The contractual nature of tort-tracts is also evident by the fact
that courts treat them as such. 255 They first attempt to determine

whether there was an agreement and what was actually agreed. 256
When the non-injuring party agreed to a reckless drive under the
influence of alcohol, courts impose liability on all. Each party is
held to her tort-tractual commitment to share the cost of the tortious
enterprise (e.g., Cooper).257 The same is true if a party agreed to
drive carelessly but then drove carefully (e.g., Bierczynski258 and
LemonS 259).

In contrast, if a party agreed to careless but not

reckless behavior,

she would be exempted from liability (e.g.,

Dunfee, 260 Keith, 26 1 and Bogle262).

E.

Solvency

Another concern could be that the possibility of insolvency of
one or some of the actors would chill tort-tracting. The concern is
unfounded for at least two reasons. First, some states switched
from joint and several liability to several liability thereby protecting
injurers from risks of insolvency by their associates. 263 Second, even
in those states that still apply the old common law rule of joint and
several liability, each party decides who to tort-tract with. A risk-

254.
255.
256.

See supra notes 3, 7 and accompanying text.

See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
See supra note 97 and accompanying text.

257. See Cooper v. Bondoni, 841 P.2d 608, 612 (Okla. Civ. App. 1992).
258. See Bierczynski v. Rogers, 239 A.2d 218, 221 (Del. 1968).
259. See Lemons v. Kelly, 397 P.3d.784, 787 (Or. 1964)
260. See Champion ex rel. Ezzo v. Dunfee, 939 A.2d 825, 833-34 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2008).
261. See Keith v. J.A., 295 F. App'x 309, 311 (10th Cir. 2008).
262. See Bogle v. Conway, 422 P.2d 971, 975 (Kan. 1967).
263. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT LIAB. § 10 (AM. LAW
INST. 2000) ("Joint and several liability imposes the risk that one or more
tortfeasors liable for the plaintiffs damages is insolvent on the remaining
solvent defendants, while several liability imposes this insolvency risk on the
plaintiff.").
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averse tort-tractor may only want to tort-tract with individuals or
entities she believes to be solvent, perhaps because she is familiar
with them. Others may be more adventurous and assume the risk
of tort-tracting with a stranger. The point is that each tort-tractor
makes her own choices.
F.

Apportionment

Others may have concerns about the assumption in the
examples that the damage is apportioned in equal shares between
the tort-tractors. The claim could be that a jury may apportion one
actor (e.g., the injuring driver in a drag race) more liability than
others (e.g., the non-injuring actors). This is true, but it is also
irrelevant. To determine what the parties will do, we have to test
their incentives at the time they decided to enter into a tort-tract.
For example, in Example 2 (drag racing), the jury may decide to
assign 10% of the fault to D1 and 90% to D2 or vice versa. But exante, this does not matter. When the parties consider whether to
engage in the activity each has a 50% chance to be the one who pays
10% of the damage and a 50% chance to be the one who pays 90% of
$50
of
liability
an
expected
damage,
for
the
More generally, it is possible to
(50%x10%x100+50%x90%x100).
show that regardless of the apportionment of fault or the
apportionment regime (whether it is joint and several liability with
or without contribution or several liability), ex-ante each actor has
an expected liability of D/n, where D is the damage and n is the
number of tortfeasors. 264
G.

The Efficiency-Morality Debate

A major question is whether tort-tracts-that is, agreements or
commitments to engage in tortious behaviors-could be considered
The question is both
moral and whether they are efficient.
theoretical and empirical. In order to focus on what the law does,
this Article sidestepped the efficiency-morality debate. Its goal is to
highlight a phenomenon and spark a debate. Those who believe
tort-tracts are immoral, or for other reasons, unacceptable, would
want to change the law, increase the use and efficacy of anti-dilution
mechanisms (e.g., punitive damages), or increase the role of the
criminal justice system.
Still, the Article contributes to this debate in a few ways. First,
it explicitly admits that, in some cases, tort-tracts can lead to
inefficient results. Second, it also acknowledges that even when
they are welfare-enhancing, other mechanisms (such as regulation)
may achieve the same benefits at a lower cost and as such, should be
preferable. Third, to help frame the debate, the Article identifies
Example 1 and its variants
three categories of tort-tracts.
264. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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(publishing a statement that is known to be false) deal with torttracts that are aimed at achieving a tortious result: harming a third
party. Example 2 and its variants (drag racing) focus on activities
(not results) in which the parties are interested but society seems to
condemn. Finally, Example 3 and its variants focus on activities
that society accepts (e.g., camping), often invites (e.g., farming), and
may even be faultless (e.g., the production of necessary goods subject
to strict liability). Fourth, by using the same methodology across
categories, the Article shows how currently, tort law treats all
categories the same: in each the law dilutes the parties' liability and
protects the injurers' ex-ante expectations, although in varying
degrees. In doing so, tort law respects the tortfeasors' subjective
valuations. It even gives these private valuations precedence over
what is often described as the victim's "right" to be free of harm. By
revealing the similarities between the law's treatments, this Article
seeks to invigorate the debate.
Finally, it is important to note that efficiency considerations
should include long-term impact and third-party effects.
For
example, in Example 2, the total benefits to the parties from a race
outweigh, at least initially, the cost to the victim (60x2>100). But
one should also consider the fact that the law probably leads
potential victims to over-invest in precaution and under invest in
capital. It likely also results in discrimination against minorities
whose income is, on average, lower than other groups. 265
CONCLUSION

In many cases actors will not participate in tortious activity
unless others pre-commit to do the same or share its costs. Contract
law refuses to help such actors. It will not enforce an agreement to
commit or induce a tort. This Article shows that tort law fills some
of that gap. Tort law allows parties to easily enter into tortious
engagements. Tort law does so by offering the parties a default
arrangement-a tort-tract. The arrangement includes opt-in and
opt-out rules, cost-sharing mechanisms, and cross-claims waivers.
It is even designed to curb strategic behavior by those who promised
to behave carelessly and then act differently. The result is that the
actors do not need to negotiate, devise, or draft the terms that would
regulate their behavior. Instead of contracting they can tort-tract,
that is, adopt tort law's arrangement.
Tort law even goes a step further and facilitates "tort-tracting,"
the act of agreeing, or pre-committing, to engage in or sponsor a
wrongdoing. In low transaction cost settings, this can be done if the
parties actually agree to accept tort law's default arrangement. For
example, in cases like Jones,266 a number of drivers and 150-300

265.

See supra note 257 and accompanying text.

266.

See generally Jones v. Reynolds, 438 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 2006).
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bystanders can become partners to the joint tortious enterprise by
indicating their agreement (e.g., by waiving their hands). In high
transaction costs settings, the parties can pre-commit to be part of a
tortious enterprise by unilaterally and credibly signaling their
commitment. Tort law even encourages parties to join the tortfest
by allowing them to "test the ground" by way of sampling. Thus, in
cases like Warren 267 and Example 3A, 2 68 each polluting agent was
able to initially produce and pollute on a small scale to see if others
would follow suit, and then decide to keep polluting if others do the
same, but be exempted from liability otherwise.
Finally, tort law also provides an effective enforcement
mechanism. It promises a gain to the injurers-the non-breaching
parties who acted tortiously. By contrast, it punishes the breaching
parties who decided to behave carefully (Lemons) 269 or behave with
even less care than the parties agreed to (Dunfee).270 The result is
an irony. Tort law invites, polices, and enforces wrongdoing.

267.
268.
269.
270.

See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
See supra Subpart II.A.3.
See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.

